We consider a repeated sequential game between a learner, who plays first, and an opponent who responds to the chosen action. We seek to design strategies for the learner to successfully interact with the opponent. While most previous approaches consider known opponent models, we focus on the setting in which the opponent's model is unknown. To this end, we use kernel-based regularity assumptions to capture and exploit the structure in the opponent's response. We propose a novel algorithm for the learner when playing against an adversarial sequence of opponents. The algorithm combines ideas from bilevel optimization and online learning to effectively balance between exploration (learning about the opponent's model) and exploitation (selecting highly rewarding actions for the learner). Our results include algorithm's regret guarantees that depend on the regularity of the opponent's response and scale sublinearly with the number of game rounds. Moreover, we specialize our approach to repeated Stackelberg games, and empirically demonstrate its effectiveness in a traffic routing and wildlife conservation task
Tianjin University（天津大学）；Washington State University（华盛顿州立大学）
The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma has guided research on social dilemmas for decades. However, it distinguishes between only two atomic actions: cooperate and defect. In real-world prisoner's dilemmas, these choices are temporally extended and different strategies may correspond to sequences of actions, reflecting grades of cooperation. We introduce a Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma (SPD) game to better capture the aforementioned characteristics. In this work, we propose a deep multiagent reinforcement learning approach that investigates the evolution of mutual cooperation in SPD games. Our approa…
Regret minimization has proved to be a versatile tool for tree-form sequential decision making and extensive-form games. In large two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games, modern extensions of counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) are currently the practical state of the art for computing a Nash equilibrium. Most regret-minimization algorithms for tree-form sequential decision making, including CFR, require (i) an exact model of the player's decision nodes, observation nodes, and how they are linked, and (ii) full knowledge, at all times t, about the payoffs -- even in parts of the d…
Recommender systems have been investigated for many years, with the aim of generating the most accurate recommendations possible. However, available data about new users is often insufficient, leading to inaccurate recommendations; an issue that is known as the cold-start problem. A solution can be active learning. Active learning strategies proactively select items and ask users to rate these. This way, detailed user preferences can be acquired and as a result, more accurate recommendations can be offered to the user. In this study, we compare five active learning algorithms, combined with th…
In this paper, we present exploitability descent, a new algorithm to compute approximate equilibria in two-player zero-sum extensive-form games with imperfect information, by direct policy optimization against worst-case opponents. We prove that when following this optimization, the exploitability of a player's strategy converges asymptotically to zero, and hence when both players employ this optimization, the joint policies converge to a Nash equilibrium. Unlike fictitious play (XFP) and counterfactual regret minimization (CFR), our convergence result pertains to the policies being optimized …
Regret minimization is a powerful tool for solving large-scale extensive-form games. State-of-the-art methods rely on minimizing regret locally at each decision point. In this work we derive a new framework for regret minimization on sequential decision problems and extensive-form games with general compact convex sets at each decision point and general convex losses, as opposed to prior work which has been for simplex decision points and linear losses. We call our framework laminar regret decomposition. It generalizes the CFR algorithm to this more general setting. Furthermore, our framework …
Delft University of Technology（代尔夫特理工大学）；VU Amsterdam（阿姆斯特丹自由大学）
Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) and Evolution Strategies (ESs) have surpassed human-level control in many sequential decision-making problems, yet many open challenges still exist. To get insights into the strengths and weaknesses of DRL versus ESs, an analysis of their respective capabilities and limitations is provided. After presenting their fundamental concepts and algorithms, a comparison is provided on key aspects such as scalability, exploration, adaptation to dynamic environments, and multi-agent learning. Then, the benefits of hybrid algorithms that combine concepts from DRL and ESs…
Learning to Bid in Non-Stationary Repeated First-Price Auctions
Department of Mathematics, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology（数学系，香港科学与技术大学）；Stern School of Business, New York University（纽约大学斯特恩商学院）；Department of IEDA, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology（IEDA系，香港科学与技术大学）
Partial monitoring is a general model for sequential learning with limited feedback formalized as a game between two players. In this game, the learner chooses an action and at the same time the opponent chooses an outcome, then the learner suffers a loss and receives a feedback signal. The goal of the learner is to minimize the total loss. In this paper, we study partial monitoring with finite actions and stochastic outcomes. We derive a logarithmic distribution-dependent regret lower bound that defines the hardness of the problem. Inspired by the DMED algorithm (Honda and Takemura, 2010) for…
The Fuqua School of Business, Duke University（杜克大学富卡商学院）；Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University（斯坦福大学商学院）
We study the query complexity of a learner-private sequential learning problem, motivated by the privacy and security concerns due to eavesdropping that arise in practical applications such as pricing and Federated Learning. A learner tries to estimate an unknown scalar value, by sequentially querying an external database and receiving binary responses; meanwhile, a third-party adversary observes the learner's queries but not the responses. The learner's goal is to design a querying strategy with the minimum number of queries (optimal query complexity) so that she can accurately estimate the t…
Developing efficient sequential bidding strategies for repeated auctions is an important practical challenge in various marketing tasks. In this setting, the bidding agent obtains information, on both the value of the item at sale and the behavior of the other bidders, only when she wins the auction. Standard bandit theory does not apply to this problem due to the presence of action-dependent censoring. In this work, we consider second-price auctions and propose novel, efficient UCB-like algorithms for this task. These algorithms are analyzed in the stochastic setting, assuming regularity of t…
Online learning with expert advice is a fundamental problem of sequential prediction. In this problem, the algorithm has access to a set of $n$ "experts" who make predictions on each day. The goal on each day is to process these predictions, and make a prediction with the minimum cost. After making a prediction, the algorithm sees the actual outcome on that day, updates its state, and then moves on to the next day. An algorithm is judged by how well it does compared to the best expert in the set. The classical algorithm for this problem is the multiplicative weights algorithm. However, every a…
