从深度学习的角度攻击分裂制造
Attacking Split Manufacturing from a Deep Learning Perspective
摘要:
集成电路拆分制造的概念是将前端线(FEOL)和后端线(BEOL)部件委托给不同的代工厂,以防止生产过剩、知识产权(IP)盗版或对手在FEOL设施中有针对性地插入硬件木马。在这项工作中,我们挑战的安全承诺,通过制定各种布局层次的布局和布线提示矢量和图像为基础的功能,分裂制造。我们构建了一个复杂的深度神经网络,它可以高精度地推断丢失的BEOL连接。与公开的网络流攻击[1]相比,对于同一组ISCAS-85基准测试,我们在M1上分裂时达到1.21倍的准确率,在M3上分裂时达到1.12倍的准确率,运行时间不到1%。
英文摘要:
The notion of integrated circuit split manufacturing which delegates the front-end-of-line (FEOL) and back-end-of-line (BEOL) parts to different foundries, is to prevent overproduction, piracy of the intellectual property (IP), or targeted insertion of hardware Trojans by adversaries in the FEOL facility. In this work, we challenge the security promise of split manufacturing by formulating various layout-level placement and routing hints as vector- and image-based features. We construct a sophisticated deep neural network which can infer the missing BEOL connections with high accuracy. Compared with the publicly available network-flow attack [1], for the same set of ISCAS-85 benchmarks, we achieve 1.21X accuracy when splitting on M1 and 1.12X accuracy when splitting on M3 with less than 1% running time.
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