GRANDPA：拜占庭式的终结性小工具
GRANDPA: a Byzantine Finality Gadget
摘要：
经典的拜占庭容错共识协议为了保持安全性而在面对恶意时丧失了活性，而大多数部署的区块链协议为了保持活性而丧失了安全性。在这项工作中，我们实现了最好的两个世界，提出了一种新颖的抽象称为终结小工具。finality gadget允许事务总是乐观地提交，但通知客户端这些事务可能不安全。因此，区块链可以乐观地执行交易，并且只有在经过充分和可证明的审计之后才提交它们。在这项工作中，我们正式建模的finality gadget抽象，证明这是不可能的，以确定性的方式解决它在完全一致性（即使它比共识更强），并提供了一个部分同步协议，目前正在保护一个主要的区块链。通过这种方式，我们表明，协议设计者可以解耦安全性和活性，以加快故障恢复。我们认为，可能有其他类型的终结性小工具，提供较弱的安全性（例如，概率性的），以便获得更高的效率，并且这可以取决于网络不同步的概率。
英文摘要：
Classic Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus protocols forfeit liveness in the face of asynchrony in order to preserve safety, whereas most deployed blockchain protocols forfeit safety in order to remain live. In this work, we achieve the best of both worlds by proposing a novel abstractions called the finality gadget. A finality gadget allows for transactions to always optimistically commit but informs the clients that these transactions might be unsafe. As a result, a blockchain can execute transactions optimistically and only commit them after they have been sufficiently and provably audited. In this work, we formally model the finality gadget abstraction, prove that it is impossible to solve it deterministically in full asynchrony (even though it is stronger than consensus) and provide a partially synchronous protocol which is currently securing a major blockchain. This way we show that the protocol designer can decouple safety and liveness in order to speed up recovery from failures. We believe that there can be other types of finality gadgets that provide weaker safety (e.g., probabilistic) in order to gain more efficiency and this can depend on the probability that the network is not in synchrony.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
