关于合作的意见
Observations on Cooperation
摘要:
我们研究的环境中,代理人随机匹配发挥囚徒困境,每个球员观察一些合作伙伴的过去的行动对以前的对手。我们离开现有的相关文献,允许一小部分人口的承诺类型。忠诚的代理人的存在破坏了先前提出的持续合作机制。我们提出了一种新颖的直观的战略组合,在各种环境中维持合作。此外,我们表明,在一个额外的假设平稳,这种策略的组合基本上是唯一的机制,以支持充分合作,它是强大的各种扰动。最后,我们将结果扩展到一个设置中,代理人也观察过去的对手对当前的合作伙伴所采取的行动,我们的特点是观察结构是最佳的持续合作。
英文摘要:
We study environments in which agents are randomly matched to play a Prisoner's Dilemma, and each player observes a few of the partner's past actions against previous opponents. We depart from the existing related literature by allowing a small fraction of the population to be commitment types. The presence of committed agents destabilizes previously proposed mechanisms for sustaining cooperation. We present a novel intuitive combination of strategies that sustains cooperation in various environments. Moreover, we show that under an additional assumption of stationarity, this combination of strategies is essentially the unique mechanism to support full cooperation, and it is robust to various perturbations. Finally, we extend the results to a setup in which agents also observe actions played by past opponents against the current partner, and we characterize which observation structure is optimal for sustaining cooperation.
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