避免欺凌:不平等之间合作的弹性
Avoiding the bullies: The resilience of cooperation among unequals
摘要:
如果存在着确保在冲突中获胜的占支配地位的个人,平等主义的规范或惯例能否继续存在下去?我们研究了在争夺资源的冲突博弈中,权力不对称和伙伴选择的相互作用。我们引入三个模型来研究不平等之间的合作的出现和弹性时,互动是随机的,当个人可以选择他们的合作伙伴,权力不对称动态地依赖于累积的收益。我们发现,合作伙伴的选择提供了更高的竞争能力,以避免欺负的能力,主要是恢复合作公约和竞争层次结构从来没有形成。伙伴选择抵消了网络中孤立的欺凌者的超级优势,消除了其他人在联盟中协调的需要。当竞争能力动态地依赖于累积收益时,网络-策略-等级耦合变化的复杂周期出现了。有效的合作者会获得声望(从而获得权力),采取攻击性行为,被孤立,最终失去权力。网络和行为都不会收敛到一个稳定的平衡点。尽管权力动态不稳定,但人口中的合作惯例总体上保持稳定,长期的不平等被完全消除。伙伴选择和动态权力不对称之间的相互作用对这些结果至关重要:如果没有伙伴选择,欺负者就不能被孤立,如果没有动态权力不对称,欺负者即使被孤立也不会失去他们的权力。我们分析确定一个单一的临界点,标志着一个相变在我们的模型的所有三个迭代。这个临界点是第一个人打破常规和周期开始出现的地方。
英文摘要:
Can egalitarian norms or conventions survive the presence of dominant individuals who are ensured of victory in conflicts? We investigate the interaction of power asymmetry and partner choice in games of conflict over a contested resource. We introduce three models to study the emergence and resilience of cooperation among unequals when interaction is random, when individuals can choose their partners, and where power asymmetries dynamically depend on accumulated payoffs. We find that the ability to avoid bullies with higher competitive ability afforded by partner choice mostly restores cooperative conventions and that the competitive hierarchy never forms. Partner choice counteracts the hyper dominance of bullies who are isolated in the network and eliminates the need for others to coordinate in a coalition. When competitive ability dynamically depends on cumulative payoffs, complex cycles of coupled network-strategy-rank changes emerge. Effective collaborators gain popularity (and thus power), adopt aggressive behavior, get isolated, and ultimately lose power. Neither the network nor behavior converge to a stable equilibrium. Despite the instability of power dynamics, the cooperative convention in the population remains stable overall and long-term inequality is completely eliminated. The interaction between partner choice and dynamic power asymmetry is crucial for these results: without partner choice, bullies cannot be isolated, and without dynamic power asymmetry, bullies do not lose their power even when isolated. We analytically identify a single critical point that marks a phase transition in all three iterations of our models. This critical point is where the first individual breaks from the convention and cycles start to emerge.
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