如何选择观察员
How to Select Observers
摘要：
物理学、数学和哲学中的许多问题都涉及到特定情况下的观察者，这导致了关于特定于观察者的信息是否应该影响某些结果或假设的概率的争论。我们的目的并不是要提倡这种观察者选择效应，而是要证明任何这样的效应在很大程度上取决于所做的假设。我们专注于辩论存在的“末日效应”-是否观察员指数信息应该导致一个有利于可能性与较少的观察员，这一直被认为有影响的宇宙学模型。我们的中心目标是通过引入一种形式主义来揭示所做的假设，并解决在此类问题中尚未明确阐述的一个关键问题：观察者是否是通过从一组世界中挑选或存在于一组世界中来选择的，从而调和文献中明显的不一致。在前者中，通常存在观察者选择效应，而在后者中，通常不存在。这导致我们区分我们所谓的“包容性”和“排他性”选择，以及它们与多元宇宙概念的关系。然后，我们放松假设，所有的观察者都是同样典型的，并考虑玻尔兹曼大脑的问题，表明典型性可以在解决问题中发挥作用。然后，我们强调需要规模不变的问题，这使我们分析J.理查德戈特的方法来解决这个问题。这一切都使我们能够分析世界末日和普遍世界末日的论点。我们发现，没有世界末日效应，缺乏一套假设，我们觉得有点不合理。然后，我们用我们的形式主义来解决哲学界的一个争论，称为“睡美人问题”。最后，我们以一个启发式的总结来结束，没有公式，并指出这一研究方向的未来可能方向。
英文摘要：
A number of problems in physics, mathematics, and philosophy involve observers in given situations which lead to debates about whether observer-specific information should affect the probability for some outcome or hypothesis. Our purpose is not to advocate for such observer selection effects, but rather to show that any such effects depend greatly on the assumptions made. We focus on the debate about the existence of a `Doomsday effect'---whether observer index information should cause one to favor possibilities with fewer observers, which has been argued to have implications for models of cosmology. Our central goal is to reconcile the apparent inconsistencies in the literature by introducing a formalism to lay bare assumptions made and address a key issue that has not been clearly articulated in such problems: whether the observer is selected by *picking from* or *being in* a set of worlds. In the former there generally are observer selection effects, and in the latter there generally are not. This leads us to differentiate what we call *inclusive* from *exclusive* selection, and how they relate to the concept of a multiverse. Then we relax the assumption that all observers are equally typical, and consider the problem of Boltzmann brains, showing that typicality can play a role in solving the problem. We then stress the need for scale-invariant questions, which causes us to analyze J. Richard Gott's approach to the problem. This all allows us to analyze the Doomsday and Universal Doomsday arguments. We find that there is no Doomsday effect, absent a set of assumptions we find somewhat unreasonable. Then we use our formalism to resolve a debate in the philosophy community called the `Sleeping Beauty Problem.' Finally, we conclude with a heuristic summary, free from equations, and point to possible future directions of this line of research.
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