具有复杂禀赋的离散交换经济中的核心
Cores in discrete exchange economies with complex endowments
摘要：
核心是经济理论中一个传统而有用的解概念。但在没有转移支付的离散交换经济中，当禀赋复杂时，核心可能是空的。这促使Balkanov和Kotowski（2019）将捐赠解释为排斥权，并提出了一个称为排斥核心的新概念。我们的贡献是双重的。首先，我们提出了一个纠正的核心，以解决其问题下复杂的禀赋。其次，我们提出了一个改进的Balkanov和Kotowski的排斥核心，以提高其性能。我们的两个核心概念有一个共同的想法，纠正滥用利他主义的未受影响的代理人在阻止联盟。我们提出了一种机制，找到分配在两个核心。
英文摘要：
The core is a traditional and useful solution concept in economic theory. But in discrete exchange economies without transfers, when endowments are complex, the core may be empty. This motivates Balbuzanov and Kotowski (2019) to interpret endowments as exclusion rights and propose a new concept called exclusion core. Our contribution is twofold. First, we propose a rectification of the core to solve its problem under complex endowments. Second, we propose a refinement of Balbuzanov and Kotowski's exclusion core to improve its performance. Our two core concepts share a common idea of correcting the misused altruism of unaffected agents in blocking coalitions. We propose a mechanism to find allocations in the two cores.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
