arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2005.05779econ.TH
收藏

Instability of Defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma Under Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics

Srinivas Arigapudi, Yuval Heller, Igal Milchtaich

英文摘要:

We study population dynamics under which each revising agent tests each strategy k times, with each trial being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose mean payoff was highest. When k = 1, defection is globally stable in the prisoner`s dilemma. By contrast, when k > 1 we show that there exists a globally stable state in which agents cooperate with probability between 28% and 50%. Next, we characterize stability of strict equilibria in general games. Our results demonstrate that the empirically plausible case of k > 1 can yield qualitatively different predictions than the case of k = 1 that is commonly studied in the literature.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑