Third person enforcement in a prisoner's dilemma game

Asymmetric Equilibria in Symmetric Multiplayer Prisoners Dilemma Supergames

We propose a finite automaton-style solution concept for supergames. In our model, we define an equilibrium to be a cycle of state switches and a supergame to be an infinite walk on states of a finite stage game. We show that if the stage game is locally non-cooperative, and the utility function is monotonously decreasing as the number of defective agents increases, the symmetric multiagent prisoners' dilemma supergame must contain one symmetric equilibrium and can contain asymmetric equilibria.

无限重复囚徒困境中的沟通：理论与实验

Communication in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Theory and Experiments

本文在无限重复囚徒困境均衡选择理论中引入沟通降低但不消除策略不确定性的假设，解释沟通促进合作，并通过实验和机器学习内容分析予以支持。

Instability of Defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma Under Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics

We study population dynamics under which each revising agent tests each strategy k times, with each trial being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose mean payoff was highest. When k = 1, defection is globally stable in the prisoner`s dilemma. By contrast, when k > 1 we show that there exists a globally stable state in which agents cooperate with probability between 28% and 50%. Next, we characterize stability of strict equilibria in general games. Our results demonstrate that the empirically plausible case of k > 1 can yield qualitatively different predictions than the…

合作驱动囚徒困境中的相变向合作发展

Collaboration drives phase transitions towards cooperation in prisoner's dilemma

该研究通过合作环模型揭示了囚徒困境中合作的非平衡相变机制，强调合作倾向和收益驱动的动态过程。

预演失约合同：在n人囚徒困境中诱导强纳什均衡

Preplay Losing Contracts: Inducing Strong Nash Equilibrium in the $n$-player Prisoner's Dilemma

本文提出失约合同机制，通过强制减少自身效用来诱导n人囚徒困境中的强纳什均衡，避免传统预演机制的支付成本，确保合作激励的持续性。

Temporal assortment of cooperators in the spatial prisoner's dilemma

We study a spatial, one-shot prisoner's dilemma (PD) model in which selection operates on both an organism's behavioral strategy (cooperate or defect) and its choice of when to implement that strategy across a set of discrete time slots. Cooperators evolve to fixation regularly in the model when we add time slots to lattices and small-world networks, and their portion of the population grows, albeit slowly, when organisms interact in a scale-free network. This selection for cooperators occurs across a wide variety of time slots and it does so even when a crucial condition for the evolution of …