According to the subjective Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanics (QBism), the instruments used to measure quantum systems are to be regarded as an extension of the senses of the agent who is using them, and quantum states describe the agent's expectations for what they will experience through these extended senses. How can QBism then account for the fact that (i) instruments must be calibrated before they can be used to `sense' anything; (ii) some instruments are more precise than others; (iii) more precise instruments can lead to discovery of new systems? Furthermore, is the agent `incoherent' if they prefer to use a less precise instrument? Here we provide answers to these questions.
In QBism (or Quantum Bayesianism) a quantum state does not represent an element of physical reality but an agent's personal probability assignments, reflecting his subjective degrees of belief about the future content of his experience. In this paper, we contrast QBism with hidden-variable accounts of quantum mechanics and show the sense in which QBism explains quantum correlations. QBism's agent-centered worldview can be seen as a development of ideas expressed in Schrödinger's essay "Nature and the Greeks".
According to QBism, quantum states, unitary evolutions, and measurement operators are all understood as personal judgments of the agent using the formalism. Meanwhile, quantum measurement outcomes are understood as the personal experiences of the same agent. Wigner's conundrum of the friend, in which two agents ostensibly have different accounts of whether or not there is a measurement outcome, thus poses no paradox for QBism. Indeed the resolution of Wigner's original thought experiment was central to the development of QBist thinking. The focus of this paper concerns two very instructive mod…
This paper expresses what a breath of fresh air it has been since a few phenomenological philosophers have started to engage with QBism. In service of the newfound discussion, the aim of this exposition is to lay out the structure of QBism as clearly as possible for that audience. In the process, we arrive at eight tenets for QBism: 1) A quantum state is an agent's personal judgment. 2) A quantum measurement is an agent's action upon its external world. 3) Quantum measurement outcomes are personal to the agent performing the action. 4) The quantum formalism is normative rather than descriptive…
QBism is one of the main candidates for an epistemic interpretation of quantum mechanics. According to QBism, the quantum state or the wavefunction represents the subjective degrees of belief of the agent assigning the state. But, although the quantum state is not part of the furniture of the world, quantum mechanics grasps the real via the Born rule which is a consistency condition for the probability assignments of the agent. In this paper, we evaluate the plausibility of recent criticism of QBism . We focus on the consequences of the subjective character of the quantum state, the issue of r…
In this short essay we reject the interpretation of quantum theory called quantum Bayesianism (Qbism) which has been promoted recently by David Mermin in his essay published in Nature. According to Qbism quantum states are personal judgements of human agents. Physicists are not verifying their personal beliefs about their observations but search for the mathematical abstract description allowing to explain and to predict in a quantitative way the regularities observed (and those to be discovered) in physical phenomena which exist independently of the presence of any agent. We reject also the c…
QBism is a recently developed version of Quantum Bayesianism. QBists think that the primitive concept of experience is the central subject of science. QBism refuses the idea that the quantum state of a system is an objective description of this system. It is a tool for assigning a subjective probability to the agent's future experience. So quantum mechanics does not directly say something about the "external world". A measurement (in the usual sense) is just a special case of what QBism calls experience and this is any action done by any agent on her external world. The result of the measureme…
The interpretation of quantum theory known as QBism argues that many elements of the formalism have a subjective interpretation. At the same time, QBism claims to be a broadly realist program. This implies that reality in QBism must be somehow founded upon an agent's subjective experiences (measurement outcomes). To make this idea more precise, we propose to interpret QBism's "experiences" as synonymous with the concept of "perceived phenomena" in phenomenology. This suggests an approach to ontology in which objects can only be physically real if they are in principle observable. But what does…
In a recent no-go theorem [Bong et al, Nature Physics (2020)], we proved that the predictions of unitary quantum mechanics for an extended Wigner's friend scenario are incompatible with any theory satisfying three metaphysical assumptions, the conjunction of which we call "Local Friendliness": Absoluteness of Observed Events, Locality and No-Superdeterminism. In this paper (based on an invited talk for the QBism jubilee at the 2019 Vaxjo conference) I discuss the implications of this theorem for QBism, as seen from the perspective of experimental metaphysics. I argue that the key distinction b…
This article summarizes the Quantum Bayesian point of view of quantum mechanics, with special emphasis on the view's outer edges---dubbed QBism. QBism has its roots in personalist Bayesian probability theory, is crucially dependent upon the tools of quantum information theory, and most recently, has set out to investigate whether the physical world might be of a type sketched by some false-started philosophies of 100 years ago (pragmatism, pluralism, nonreductionism, and meliorism). Beyond conceptual issues, work at Perimeter Institute is focused on the hard technical problem of finding a good…
Without Niels Bohr, QBism would be nothing. But QBism is not Bohr. This paper attempts to show that, despite a popular misconception, QBism is no minor tweak to Bohr's interpretation of quantum mechanics. It is something quite distinct. Along the way, we lay out three tenets of QBism in some detail: 1) The Born Rule---the foundation of what quantum theory means for QBism---is a normative statement. It is about the decision-making behavior any individual agent should strive for; it is not a descriptive "law of nature" in the usual sense. 2) All probabilities, including all quantum probabilities…
In the last five years of his life Itamar Pitowsky developed the idea that the formal structure of quantum theory should be thought of as a Bayesian probability theory adapted to the empirical situation that Nature's events just so happen to conform to a non-Boolean algebra. QBism too takes a Bayesian stance on the probabilities of quantum theory, but its probabilities are the personal degrees of belief a sufficiently-schooled agent holds for the consequences of her actions on the external world. Thus QBism has two levels of the personal where the Pitowskyan view has one. The differences go fu…
Quantum Bayesianism, or QBism, is a recent development of the epistemic view of quantum states, according to which the state vector represents knowledge about a quantum system, rather than the true state of the system. QBism explicitly adopts the subjective view of probability, wherein probability assignments express an agent's personal degrees of belief about an event. QBists claim that most if not all conceptual problems of quantum mechanics vanish if we simply take a proper epistemic and probabilistic perspective. Although this judgement is largely subjective and logically consistent, I exp…
There is a significant body of literature, which includes Itamar Pitowksy's "Betting on Outcomes of Measurements," that sheds light on the structure of quantum mechanics, and the ways in which it differs from classical mechanics, by casting the theory in terms of agents' bets on the outcomes of experiments. Though this approach, by itself, is neutral as to the ontological status of quantum observables and quantum states, some, notably those who adopt the label "QBism" for their views, take this approach as providing incentive to conclude that quantum states represent nothing in physical realit…
Bayesian rational agents in iterated quantum games
Center for Quantum Information and Control, University of New Mexico（新墨西哥大学量子信息与控制中心）；Department of Physics and Astronomy, Tufts University（塔夫茨大学物理与天文学系）
The theories of pre-quantum physics are standardly seen as representing physical systems and their properties. Quantum mechanics in its standard form is a more problematic case: here, interpretational problems have led to doubts about the tenability of realist views. Thus, QBists and Quantum Pragmatists maintain that quantum mechanics should not be thought of as representing physical systems, but rather as an agent-centered tool for updating beliefs about such systems. It is part and parcel of such views that different agents may have different beliefs and may assign different quantum states. …
The non-extensibility of quantum theory into a theory with improved predictive power is based on a strong assumption of independent free choice, in which the physicists pick a measurement axis independently of anything that couldn't have been caused by their decision. Independent free choice is also at the core of the Nash equilibrium and classical game theory. A more recent line of game-theoretical research based on weakening free choice leads to non-trivial solution concepts with desirable properties such as at-most uniqueness, Pareto optimality, and contextuality. We show how introducing co…
