物理学哲学中的相互承认：量子贝叶斯主义（QBism）、现象学、黑格尔
Mutual Recognition in the Philosophy of Physics: QBism, Phenomenology, Hegel
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中文总结 AI 辅助
本文通过分析QBism对维格纳的朋友悖论的回应，揭示其隐含的相互承认能动性概念，并结合现象学与黑格尔的相关理论，为QBism本体论的阐释与辩护提供新的概念资源。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
近期关于量子贝叶斯主义（QBism）的讨论日益转向其本体论问题。笔者认为，通过重构QBism对维格纳的朋友悖论的回应，可识别出其能动性本体论的关键洞见。笔者厘清了该回应的两种表述之间的关系：一种基于量子态是能动者的个人概率赋值这一主张，另一种基于将所有量子理论使用者视为平等能动者的指令。经澄清后，这些表述揭示了对相互承认的能动性概念的隐含承诺，即量子理论使用者的能动地位在构成上依赖于对其他能动者的承认。该分析阐明了近期QBism与现象学互动的关键所在——即对这一能动性概念的更具哲学严谨性的阐释。笔者展示了梅洛-庞蒂的主体间性理论如何支撑QBism所隐含的相互承认结构，并将这些主题追溯至黑格尔的相互承认理论。通过将QBism置于悠久的相互承认传统中，笔者主张我们不仅能阐明其理论结构，还能为其本体论的严格表述与辩护开辟新的概念资源。
英文摘要
Recent discussions of QBism have turned increasingly toward the question of its ontology. I argue that key insights into QBism's ontology of agency can be identified by reconstructing its response to Wigner's friend paradox. I clarify the relation between two formulations of that response: one grounded in the claim that quantum states are agents' personal probability assignments, and another grounded in the injunction to treat all users of quantum theory as agents on equal footing. Once disambiguated, these formulations reveal an implicit commitment to a mutually recognitive conception of agency, according to which the agential status of a user of quantum theory depends constitutively on the acknowledgement of other agents. This analysis clarifies what is at stake in recent QBist engagements with phenomenology - namely, the search for a more philosophically robust account of this conception of agency. I show how Merleau-Ponty's account of intersubjectivity underpins the recognitive structure implicated in QBism before tracing these themes to Hegel's account of mutual recognition. By locating QBism within a longstanding tradition of mutual recognition, I claim that we not only illuminate its theoretical structure but also open up novel conceptual resources for the rigorous articulation and justification of its ontology.
