We consider an extension of a noncooperative game problem where players have joint binding constraints. In this case, justification of a generalized equilibrium point needs a reasonable mechanism for attaining this state. We suggest to combine a penalty method together with shares allocation of right-hand sides, which replaces the initial problem with a sequence of the usual Nash equilibrium problems together with an upper level variational inequality as a master problem. We show convergence of solutions of these auxiliary penalized problems to a solution of the initial game problem under weak coercivity conditions.
We consider a general decomposable convex optimization problem. By using right-hand side allocation technique, it can be transformed into a collection of small dimensional optimization problems. The master problem is a convex non-smooth optimization problem. We propose to apply the exact non-smooth penalty method, which gives a solution of the initial problem under some fixed penalty parameter and provides the consistency of lower level problems. The master problem is suggested to be solved by a two-speed subgradient projection method, which enhances the step-size selection. Preliminary result…
This paper defines a convertible nonconvex function(CN function for short) and a weak (strong) uniform (decomposable, exact) CN function, proves the optimization conditions for their global solutions and proposes algorithms for solving the unconstrained optimization problems with the decomposable CN function. First, to illustrate the fact that some nonconvex functions, nonsmooth or discontinuous, are actually weak uniform CN functions, examples are given. The operational properties of the CN functions are proved, including addition, subtraction, multiplication, division and compound operations…
In this work, we study the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem for monotone generalized noncooperative games with set constraints and shared affine inequality constraints. A distributed regularized penalty method is proposed. The idea is to use a differentiable penalty function with a time-varying penalty parameter to deal with the inequality constraints. A time-varying regularization term is used to deal with the ill-poseness caused by the monotonicity assumption and the time-varying penalty term. The asymptotic convergence to the least-norm variational equilibrium of the game is pro…
In this paper, we propose a novel decomposition approach for mixed-integer stochastic programming (SMIP) problems that is inspired by the combination of penalty-based Lagrangian and block Gauss-Seidel methods (PBGS). In this sense, PBGS is developed such that the inherent decomposable structure that SMIPs present can be exploited in a computationally efficient manner. The performance of the proposed method is compared with the Progressive Hedging method (PH), which also can be viewed as a Lagrangian-based method for obtaining solutions for SMIP. Numerical experiments performed using instances …
Saddle-point problems appear in various settings including machine learning, zero-sum stochastic games, and regression problems. We consider decomposable saddle-point problems and study an extension of the alternating direction method of multipliers to such saddle-point problems. Instead of solving the original saddle-point problem directly, this algorithm solves smaller saddle-point problems by exploiting the decomposable structure. We show the convergence of this algorithm for convex-concave saddle-point problems under a mild assumption. We also provide a sufficient condition for which the a…
Inria（法国国立信息学及应用数学研究院）；CNRS (French National Center for Scientific Research)（法国国家科学研究中心）
Starting from a heuristic learning scheme for N-person games, we derive a new class of continuous-time learning dynamics consisting of a replicator-like drift adjusted by a penalty term that renders the boundary of the game's strategy space repelling. These penalty-regulated dynamics are equivalent to players keeping an exponentially discounted aggregate of their on-going payoffs and then using a smooth best response to pick an action based on these performance scores. Owing to this inherent duality, the proposed dynamics satisfy a variant of the folk theorem of evolutionary game theory and th…
We consider an energy system with $n$ consumers who are linked by a Demand Side Management (DSM) contract, i.e. they agreed to diminish, at random times, their aggregated power consumption by a predefined volume during a predefined duration. Their failure to deliver the service is penalised via the difference between the sum of the $n$ power consumptions and the contracted target. We are led to analyse a non-zero sum stochastic game with $n$ players, where the interaction takes place through a cost which involves a delay induced by the duration included in the DSM contract. When $n \to \infty$…
In this paper, we present an optimal control problem for stochastic differential games under Markov regime-switching forward-backward stochastic differential equations with jumps and partial information. First, we prove a sufficient maximum principle for non zero-sum stochastic differential game problems and obtain equilibrium point for such games. Second, we prove an equivalent maximum principle for non zero-sum stochastic differential games. The zero-sum stochastic differential games equivalent maximum principle is then obtained as a corollary. We apply the obtained results to study a proble…
A Regularized Nikaido-Isoda Function Approach to Multi-Leader-Follower Games
Graduate School of Engineering, Nagoya Institute of Technology（名古屋工业大学大学院工学研究科）；Faculty of Science and Technology, Seikei University（圣德大学理工学部）；Graduate School of Informatics, Kyoto University（京都大学大学院情报学研究科）
Increasing connectivity of communication networks enables large-scale distributed processing over networks and improves the efficiency for information exchange. However, malware and virus can take advantage of the high connectivity to spread over the network and take control of devices and servers for illicit purposes. In this paper, we use an SIS epidemic model to capture the virus spreading process and develop a virus-resistant weight adaptation scheme to mitigate the spreading over the network. We propose a differential game framework to provide a theoretic underpinning for decentralized mi…
We discuss the government's reward and penalty mechanism in the presence of asymmetric information and carbon emission constraint when downstream retailers compete in a reverse supply chain network. Considering five game models which are different in terms of the coordination structure of the reverse supply chain network and power structure of the reward-penalty mechanism: (1) the reverse supply chain network centralized decision-making model; (2) the reverse supply chain network centralized decision-making model with carbon emission constraint; (3) the retailers' competition reverse supply ch…
In this paper, we consider a risk-based optimal investment problem of an insurer in a regime-switching jump diffusion model with noisy memory. Using the model uncertainty modeling, we formulate the investment problem as a zero-sum, stochastic differential delay game between the insurer and the market, with a convex risk measure of the terminal surplus and the Brownian delay surplus over a period $[T-\varrho,T]$. Then, by the BSDE approach, the game problem is solved. Finally, we derive analytical solutions of the game problem, for a particular case of a quadratic penalty function and a numeric…
Decision-making problems are commonly formulated as optimization problems, which are then solved to make optimal decisions. In this work, we consider the inverse problem where we use prior decision data to uncover the underlying decision-making process in the form of a mathematical optimization model. This statistical learning problem is referred to as data-driven inverse optimization. We focus on problems where the underlying decision-making process is modeled as a convex optimization problem whose parameters are unknown. We formulate the inverse optimization problem as a bilevel program and …
Bilevel Optimization over Saddle Points of Zero-Sum Markov Games
Shun Hing Institute of Advanced Engineering, The Chinese University of Hong Kong（香港中文大学先进工程学院）；Department of Computer Science and Engineering, The Chinese University of Hong Kong（香港中文大学计算机科学与工程系）
We consider potential games with mixed-integer variables, for which we propose two distributed, proximal-like equilibrium seeking algorithms. Specifically, we focus on two scenarios: i) the underlying game is generalized ordinal and the agents update through iterations by choosing an exact optimal strategy; ii) the game admits an exact potential and the agents adopt approximated optimal responses. By exploiting the properties of integer-compatible regularization functions used as penalty terms, we show that both algorithms converge to either an exact or an $ε$-approximate equilibrium. We corro…
This paper studies the decentralized quadratic cheap talk and signaling game problems when an encoder and a decoder, viewed as two decision makers, have misaligned objective functions. The main contributions of this study are the extension of Crawford and Sobel's cheap talk formulation to multi-dimensional sources and to noisy channel setups. We consider both (simultaneous) Nash equilibria and (sequential) Stackelberg equilibria. We show that for arbitrary scalar sources, in the presence of misalignment, the quantized nature of all equilibrium policies holds for Nash equilibria in the sense th…
Wasserstein Distributionally Robust Nash Equilibrium Seeking with Heterogeneous Data: A Lagrangian Approach
Division of Decision and Control Systems, School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, KTH Royal Institute of Technology（决策与控制系统系，电气工程与计算机科学学院，皇家理工学院）；Delft Center for Systems and Control, Delft University of Technology（系统与控制中心，代尔夫特理工大学）；Department of Mechanical Engineering and Materials Science, Duke University（机械工程与材料科学系，杜克大学）
