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arXiv 2002.11362econ.THcs.GTmath.PR

Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs

Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Omer Tamuz

英文摘要:

We study the set of possible joint posterior belief distributions of a group of agents who share a common prior regarding a binary state, and who observe some information structure. For two agents we introduce a quantitative version of Aumann's Agreement Theorem, and show that it is equivalent to a characterization of feasible distributions due to Dawid et al. (1995). For any number of agents, we characterize feasible distributions in terms of a "no-trade" condition. We use these characterizations to study information structures with independent posteriors. We also study persuasion problems with multiple receivers, exploring the extreme feasible distributions.

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