Bitcoin's single leader consensus protocol (Nakamoto consensus) suffers from significant transaction throughput and network scalability issues due to the computational requirements of it Proof-of-Work (PoW) based leader selection strategy. To overcome this, committee-based approaches (e.g., Elastico) that partition the outstanding transaction set into shards and (randomly) select multiple committees to process these transactions in parallel have been proposed and have become very popular. However, by design these committee or shard-based blockchain solutions are easily vulnerable to the Sybil attacks, where an adversary can easily compromise/manipulate the consensus protocol if it has enough computational power to generate multiple Sybil committee members (by generating multiple valid node identifiers). Despite the straightforward nature of these attacks, they have not been systematically analyzed. In this paper, we fill this research gap by modelling and analyzing Sybil attacks in a representative and popular shard-based protocol called Elastico. We show that the PoW technique used for identifier or ID generation in the initial phase of the protocol is vulnerable to Sybil attacks, and a node with high hash-power can generate enough Sybil IDs to successfully compromise Elastico. We analytically derive conditions for two different categories of Sybil attacks and perform numerical simulations to validate our theoretical results under different network and protocol parameters.
Blockchain like Bitcoin and Ethereum suffer from scalability issues. Sharding is one of the most promising and leading solutions to scale blockchain. The basic idea behind sharding is to divide the blockchain network into multiple committees, where each processing a separate set of transactions, rather than the entire network processes all transactions. In this paper, we propose a probabilistic approach to analyze the security of sharding-based blockchain protocols. Based on this approach, we investigate the threat of Sybil attacks in these protocols. The key contribution of our paper is a tra…
Our work focuses on the design of a scalable permissionless blockchain in the proof-of-stake setting. In particular, we use a distributed hash table as a building block to set up randomized shards, and then leverage the sharded architecture to validate blocks in an efficient manner. We combine verifiable Byzantine agreements run by shards of stakeholders and a block validation protocol to guarantee that forks occur with negligible probability. We impose induced churn to make shards robust to eclipse attacks, and we rely on the UTXO coin model to guarantee that any stakeholder action is securel…
With the development of decentralized consensus protocols, permissionless blockchains have been envisioned as a promising enabler for the general-purpose transaction-driven, autonomous systems. However, most of the prevalent blockchain networks are built upon the consensus protocols under the crypto-puzzle framework known as proof-of-work. Such protocols face the inherent problem of transaction-processing bottleneck, as the networks achieve the decentralized consensus for transaction confirmation at the cost of very high latency. In this paper, we study the problem of consensus formation in a …
The blockchain technology has achieved tremendous success in open (permissionless) decentralized consensus by employing proof-of-work (PoW) or its variants, whereby unauthorized nodes cannot gain disproportionate impact on consensus beyond their computational power. However, PoW-based systems incur a high delay and low throughput, making them ineffective in dealing with real-time applications. On the other hand, byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) consensus algorithms with better delay and throughput performance have been employed in closed (permissioned) settings to avoid Sybil attacks. In this pa…
Existing permissionless blockchain solutions rely on peer-to-peer propagation mechanisms, where nodes in a network transfer transaction they received to their neighbors. Unfortunately, there is no explicit incentive for such transaction propagation. Therefore, existing propagation mechanisms will not be sustainable in a fully decentralized blockchain with rational nodes. In this work, we formally define the problem of incentivizing nodes for transaction propagation. We propose an incentive mechanism where each node involved in the propagation of a transaction receives a share of the transactio…
Bitcoin uses blockchain technology and proof-of-work (PoW) mechanism where nodes spend computing resources and earn rewards in return for spending these resources. This incentive system has caused power to be significantly biased towards a few nodes, called mining pools. In fact, poor decentralization appears not only in PoW-based coins but also in coins adopting other mechanisms such as proof-of-stake (PoS) and delegated proof-of-stake (DPoS). In this paper, we target this centralization issue. To this end, we first define (m, \varepsilon, δ)-decentralization as a state that satisfies 1) ther…
Scalability problems in programmable blockchains have created a strong demand for secure methods that move the bulk of computation outside the blockchain. One of the preferred solutions to this problem involves off-chain computers that compete interactively to prove to the limited blockchain that theirs is the correct result of a given intensive computation. Each off-chain computer spends effort linear on the cost of the computation, while the blockchain adjudicates disputes spending only logarithmic effort. However, this effort is multiplied by the number of competitors, rendering disputes th…
This paper applies biomimetic engineering to the problem of permissionless Byzantine consensus and achieves results that surpass the prior state of the art by four orders of magnitude. It introduces a biologically inspired asymmetric Sybil-resistance mechanism, Proof-of-Balance, which can replace symmetric Proof-of-Work and Proof-of-Stake weighting schemes. The biomimetic mechanism is incorporated into a permissionless blockchain protocol, Key Retroactivity Network Consensus ("KRNC"), which delivers ~40,000 times the security and speed of today's decentralized ledgers. KRNC allows the fiat mon…
The emerging parallel chain protocols represent a breakthrough to address the scalability of blockchain. By composing multiple parallel chain instances, the whole systems' throughput can approach the network capacity. How to coordinate different chains' blocks and to construct them into a global ordering is critical to the performance of parallel chain protocol. However, the existed solutions use either the global synchronization clock with the single-chain bottleneck or pre-defined ordering sequences with distortion of blocks' causality to order blocks. In addition, the prior ordering methods…
Pravuil is a robust, secure, and scalable consensus protocol for a permissionless blockchain suitable for deployment in an adversarial environment such as the Internet. Pravuil circumvents previous shortcomings of other blockchains: - Bitcoin's limited adoption problem: as transaction demand grows, payment confirmation times grow much lower than other PoW blockchains - higher transaction security at a lower cost - more decentralisation than other permissionless blockchains - impossibility of full decentralisation and the blockchain scalability trilemma: decentralisation, scalability, and secur…
Blockchain protocols implement total-order broadcast in a permissionless setting, where processes can freely join and leave. In such a setting, to safeguard against Sybil attacks, correct processes rely on cryptographic proofs tied to a particular type of resource to make them eligible to order transactions. For example, in the case of Proof-of-Work (PoW), this resource is computation, and the proof is a solution to a computationally hard puzzle. Conversely, in Proof-of-Stake (PoS), the resource corresponds to the number of coins that every process in the system owns, and a secure lottery sele…
For permissionless blockchains, scalability is paramount. While current technologies still fail to address this problem fully, many research works propose sharding or other techniques that extensively adopt parallel processing of transactions. In these approaches, a potentially large number of committees of nodes independently perform consensus and process new transactions. Hence, in addition to regular intra-committee communication, (1) new transactions have to be delivered to the right committee, (2) committees need to communicate to process inter-shard transactions or (3) to exchange interm…
Increasing awareness of privacy-preserving has led to a strong focus on anonymous systems protecting anonymity. By studying early schemes, we summarize some intractable problems of anonymous systems. Centralization setting is a universal problem since most anonymous system rely on central proxies or presetting nodes to forward and mix messages, which compromises users' privacy in some way. Besides, availability becomes another important factor limiting the development of anonymous system due to the large requirement of additional additional resources (i.e. bandwidth and storage) and high laten…
Blockchain protocols come with a variety of security guarantees. For example, BFT-inspired protocols such as Algorand tend to be secure in the partially synchronous setting, while longest chain protocols like Bitcoin will normally require stronger synchronicity to be secure. Another fundamental distinction, directly relevant to scalability solutions such as sharding, is whether or not a single untrusted user is able to point to *certificates*, which provide incontrovertible proof of block confirmation. Algorand produces such certificates, while Bitcoin does not. Are these properties accidental…
