树立榜样：合作演变中的威胁信号
Making an Example: Signalling Threat in the Evolution of Cooperation
摘要：
社会惩罚被认为是确保在一次性（即非重复）互动中高度合作和遵守规范的关键方法。然而，事实证明，只有在惩罚具有高成本效益的情况下，它才能起作用。另一方面，惩罚的信号又回到了中世纪的主权，因为法语中的绞刑架这个词来源于拉丁语中的权力，并作为高级正义无情的冷酷象征。在这里，我们介绍了发出惩罚行为信号的机制，一种特殊类型的叛逃者出现了，他们可以识别这个信号，并通过恐惧来避免惩罚。我们描述的分析条件下，威胁信号可以保持高水平的合作。此外，我们进行了广泛的基于代理的模拟，以确认和扩大我们的理解的外部因素，影响社会惩罚的成功。我们表明，我们建议的机制催化合作，即使信号是昂贵的，或者当惩罚将是不切实际的。我们观察到广告报复行为的预防性质，我们认为由此产生的社会繁荣是人工智能和多智能体系统背景下的理想结果。最后，我们认为，恐惧作为一种有效的刺激亲社会行为。
英文摘要：
Social punishment has been suggested as a key approach to ensuring high levels of cooperation and norm compliance in one-shot (i.e. non-repeated) interactions. However, it has been shown that it only works when punishment is highly cost-efficient. On the other hand, signalling retribution hearkens back to medieval sovereignty, insofar as the very word for gallows in French stems from the Latin word for power and serves as a grim symbol of the ruthlessness of high justice. Here we introduce the mechanism of signalling an act of punishment and a special type of defector emerges, one who can recognise this signal and avoid punishment by way of fear. We describe the analytical conditions under which threat signalling can maintain high levels of cooperation. Moreover, we perform extensive agent-based simulations so as to confirm and expand our understanding of the external factors that influence the success of social punishment. We show that our suggested mechanism catalyses cooperation, even when signalling is costly or when punishment would be impractical. We observe the preventive nature of advertising retributive acts and we contend that the resulting social prosperity is a desirable outcome in the contexts of AI and multi-agent systems. To conclude, we argue that fear acts as an effective stimulus to pro-social behaviour.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
