威胁的剂量使合作的阻力
The Dose of the Threat Makes the Resistance for Cooperation
摘要：
通过引入威胁因子和贪婪因子，我们提出了一种新的囚徒困境博弈的支付矩阵结构，并展示了它们对记忆和合作的协同进化的影响。我们的调查结果如下。(i)记忆保护合作。(ii)令我们惊讶的是，在没有威胁的情况下，更大的记忆量对进化的成功是不利的。在没有威胁的情况下，后代会失去记忆，从而受到叛逃者的侵害。(iii)相反，适当程度的威胁的存在触发了合作的自我保护机制的出现，这表现为后代记忆容量的增加。在进化的层面上，记忆的大小就像是几代人对侵略性背叛的免疫反应。(iv)更极端的威胁再次导致叛逃。我们的研究结果可以归结为以下几点：威胁的剂量使合作的阻力。
英文摘要：
We propose to reformulate the payoff matrix structure of Prisoner's Dilemma Game, by introducing threat and greed factors, and show their effect on the co-evolution of memory and cooperation. Our findings are as follows. (i) Memory protects cooperation. (ii) To our surprise, greater memory size is unfavorable to evolutionary success when there is no threat. In the absence of threat, subsequent generations lose their memory and are consequently invaded by defectors. (iii) In contrast, the presence of an appropriate level of threat triggers the emergence of a self-protection mechanism for cooperation, which manifests itself as an increase in memory size within subsequent generations. On the evolutionary level, memory size acts like an immune response of the generations against aggressive defection. (iv) Even more extreme threat results again in defection. Our findings boil down to the following: The dose of the threat makes the resistance for cooperation.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
