外部威胁、政治更替与财政能力
External Threats, Political Turnover and Fiscal Capacity
摘要：
在大多数关于国家能力的最新文献中，战争在国家建设中的重要性假设来自外国的威胁在国内群体中产生共同利益，导致对国家能力的更大投资。然而，许多遭受外部冲突的国家并没有加强团结。相反，他们面临的派系政治往往导致破坏性的内战。本文发展了一个国家间冲突对财政能力的影响的理论，其中打击外部威胁并不总是一个共同利益的公共品，国家间冲突可能导致内战。该理论确定了外部冲突风险增加会降低内战可能性的条件，这反过来又会导致政府具有更长的政治寿命，并有更多的激励措施投资于财政能力。这些条件取决于制度的凝聚力，但这是以一种非平凡和新颖的方式：外部冲突的风险更高，导致政治更替率更低，但也使外国入侵的可能性更大，只有在制度足够不凝聚的情况下才有助于国家建设。
英文摘要：
In most of the recent literature on state capacity, the significance of wars in state-building assumes that threats from foreign countries generate common interests among domestic groups, leading to larger investments in state capacity. However, many countries that have suffered external conflicts don't experience increased unity. Instead, they face factional politics that often lead to destructive civil wars. This paper develops a theory of the impact of interstate conflicts on fiscal capacity in which fighting an external threat is not always a common-interest public good, and in which interstate conflicts can lead to civil wars. The theory identifies conditions under which an increased risk of external conflict decreases the chance of civil war, which in turn results in a government with a longer political life and with more incentives to invest in fiscal capacity. These conditions depend on the cohesiveness of institutions, but in a non-trivial and novel way: a higher risk of an external conflict that results in lower political turnover, but that also makes a foreign invasion more likely, contributes to state-building only if institutions are sufficiently incohesive.
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