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arXiv 1912.07005cs.CR
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对QC-MDPC码密码体制定时攻击的统计解释

A Statistical Explanation of the Timing Attack on QC-MDPC Code Crypto-system

Han Li

摘要:

基于准循环中密度奇偶校验(QC-MDPC)码的McEliece密码体制在2013年的\cite{QCMDPC}中首次提出,被认为是后量子时代一个有前途的竞争者。因此,了解其安全性至关重要。到目前为止,最有效的攻击是反应攻击\cite{Reaction}和定时攻击\cite{Timing}。这两种攻击都依赖于解码性能来恢复私钥。反应攻击依赖于解码失败率,而定时攻击依赖于解码期间的迭代。然而,这些攻击背后的机制仍然难以捉摸。本文通过将私钥的频谱和解码器的第一层性能联系起来,提出了一个数学模型来解释这两种攻击。

英文摘要:

The McEliece cryptosystem based on quasi-cyclic moderate-density parity-check (QC-MDPC) codes is first purposed in 2013\cite{QCMDPC} and is considered a promising contender in the post-quantum era. Understanding its security is hence essential. Till now, the most effective attacks are the reaction attack\cite{Reaction} and the timing attack\cite{Timing}. Both of these attacks rely on the decoding performance to recover the private key. The reaction attack relies on the decoding failure rate and the timing attack relies on the iterations during decoding. However, the mechanics behind these attacks remain elusive. In this paper, a mathematical model is proposed to explain both attacks by connecting the spectrum of private key and first-layer performance of the decoder.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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