创新在有限网络中的扩散：异质性、集群和双语选择对传染博弈模型中阈值的影响
Diffusion of innovations in finite networks: effects of heterogeneity, clustering, and bilingual option on the threshold in the contagion game model
摘要：
创新扩散的传染阈值的定义和计算在有限的图形（二维规则格，规则的随机网络（RRN），和两种无标度网络（SFN）），有和没有双语选项。在没有双语选项的情况下，除了那些平均度小得不切实际的网络之外，度不均匀性和聚类增强了非规则网络的传染阈值。友谊悖论和迂回效应可以解释这一现象。我们发现了使双语选择有效的成本的一般边界。对于低成本的双语选项，在规则网格、SFN和RRN中，传染阈值在规则网格中最大，在RRN中最小。正则随机网络的传染阈值与正则树的传染阈值几乎相同，是正则网络中最小的。我们发现，通过与低成本的双语选项聚类，传染阈值增加。
英文摘要：
The contagion threshold for diffusion of innovations is defined and calculated in finite graphs (two-dimensional regular lattices, regular random networks (RRNs), and two kinds of scale-free networks (SFNs)) with and without the bilingual option. Without the bilingual option, degree inhomogeneity and clustering enhance the contagion threshold in non-regular networks except for those with an unrealistically small average degree. It is explained by the friendship paradox and detour effect. We found the general boundary of the cost that makes the bilingual option effective. With a low-cost bilingual option, among regular lattices, SFNs, and RRNs, the contagion threshold is largest in regular lattices and smallest in RRNs. The contagion threshold of regular random networks is almost the same as that of the regular trees, which is the minimum among regular networks. We show that the contagion threshold increases by clustering with a low-cost bilingual option.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
