arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1909.07099cs.CR
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僵尸网络的加密隐蔽DNS攻击:挑战与对策

Encrypted and Covert DNS Queries for Botnets: Challenges and Countermeasures

Constantinos Patsakis, Fran Casino, Vasilios Katos

摘要:

现代恶意软件为了绕过部署的安全机制而进行的复杂性不断增加。一个典型的方法,以避免识别和潜在的僵尸网络命令和控制服务器的拆除是通过使用域生成算法(DGAs)域fluxing。这些算法产生了大量的域名,受感染的设备试图与之通信以找到C&C服务器,但实际上只有一小部分被注册。这使得僵尸主机能够控制并使捕获僵尸网络控制的工作变得相当困难。现有技术和实践认为,由受损设备执行的DNS查询对网络管理员是透明的,因此可以被监视、分析和阻止。在这项工作中,我们展示了后者是一个强有力的假设,因为恶意软件可以有效地隐藏其DNS查询使用隐蔽和/或加密通道绕过检测机制。为此,我们讨论了基于流量分析的可能缓解措施,以应对

英文摘要:

There is a continuous increase in the sophistication that modern malware exercise in order to bypass the deployed security mechanisms. A typical approach to evade the identification and potential takedown of a botnet command and control server is domain fluxing through the use of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs). These algorithms produce a vast amount of domain names that the infected device tries to communicate with to find the C&C server, yet only a small fragment of them is actually registered. This allows the botmaster to pivot the control and make the work of seizing the botnet control rather difficult. Current state of the art and practice considers that the DNS queries performed by a compromised device are transparent to the network administrator and therefore can be monitored, analysed, and blocked. In this work, we showcase that the latter is a strong assumption as malware could efficiently hide its DNS queries using covert and/or encrypted channels bypassing the detection mechanisms. To this end, we discuss possible mitigation measures based on traffic analysis to address the new challenges that arise f

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