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arXiv 1004.4358cs.CR
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基于特征频率分析的DNS隧道检测

Detecting DNS Tunnels Using Character Frequency Analysis

Kenton Born, David Gustafson

摘要:

高带宽隐蔽通道对公司网络内的敏感和专有信息构成重大风险。域名系统(DNS)隧道提供了一种通过网络边界秘密渗透和泄露大量信息的手段。本文通过分析DNS查询和响应中域的单字、二元和三元字符频率,探讨了检测DNS隧道的可能性。它是经验表明,如何域遵循Zipf定律在一个类似的模式,自然语言,而隧道流量具有更均匀分布的字符频率。这种方法允许跨多个域检测隧道,而以前的方法通常集中在监控点对点系统。当隧道流量与合法域流量的字符频率指纹进行比较时,可以快速发现异常。

英文摘要:

High-bandwidth covert channels pose significant risks to sensitive and proprietary information inside company networks. Domain Name System (DNS) tunnels provide a means to covertly infiltrate and exfiltrate large amounts of information passed network boundaries. This paper explores the possibility of detecting DNS tunnels by analyzing the unigram, bigram, and trigram character frequencies of domains in DNS queries and responses. It is empirically shown how domains follow Zipf's law in a similar pattern to natural languages, whereas tunneled traffic has more evenly distributed character frequencies. This approach allows tunnels to be detected across multiple domains, whereas previous methods typically concentrate on monitoring point to point systems. Anomalies are quickly discovered when tunneled traffic is compared to the character frequency fingerprint of legitimate domain traffic.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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