arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1909.06747cs.DS
收藏

操纵顺序分配的算法

Algorithms for Manipulating Sequential Allocation

Mingyu Xiao, Jiaxing Ling

摘要:

顺序分配是一种简单且广泛研究的机制,其根据代理的预先指定的拣选顺序将不可分割的物品依次分配给代理。在每一轮,拣货序列中的当前代理都会在所有尚未分配的商品中拣出其最喜欢的商品。众所周知,这个问题不是防策略的,即,代理可以通过报告项目的不真实的偏好等级而获得更多的效用。这就产生了一个问题:如何找到一个代理人的最佳反应?这是已知的,这个问题是多项式可解的只有两个代理和NP-完全的任意数量的代理。这个有三个代理的问题的计算复杂性被留下作为一个开放问题。在本文中,我们给出了一个新的算法,解决了问题的多项式时间为每个固定数量的代理。我们还表明,代理人总是可以得到至少一半的最佳效用,只需使用其真实的偏好作为响应。

英文摘要:

Sequential allocation is a simple and widely studied mechanism to allocate indivisible items in turns to agents according to a pre-specified picking sequence of agents. At each turn, the current agent in the picking sequence picks its most preferred item among all items having not been allocated yet. This problem is well-known to be not strategyproof, i.e., an agent may get more utility by reporting an untruthful preference ranking of items. It arises the problem: how to find the best response of an agent? It is known that this problem is polynomially solvable for only two agents and NP-complete for arbitrary number of agents. The computational complexity of this problem with three agents was left as an open problem. In this paper, we give a novel algorithm that solves the problem in polynomial time for each fixed number of agents. We also show that an agent can always get at least half of its optimal utility by simply using its truthful preference as the response.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑