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arXiv 1908.08600cs.LGcs.GTecon.EMstat.ML
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实时竞价拍卖中广告的在线因果推断

Online Causal Inference for Advertising in Real-Time Bidding Auctions

Cornell Johnson(康奈尔大学约翰逊商学院);Berkeley EECS(加州大学伯克利分校电气工程与计算机科学系);Stanford GSB(斯坦福大学商学院);UCSD Rady(加州大学圣迭戈分校雷迪管理学院);Yale SOM(耶鲁大学管理学院);Insper(因斯佩尔商学院);Chicago Booth(芝加哥大学布斯商学院);Temple Fox(天普大学福克斯商学院)

Caio Waisman, Harikesh S. Nair, Carlos Carrion

AI总结:

本文针对实时竞价拍卖中的广告效果评估问题,提出基于最优出价识别的因果推断方法,并设计自适应汤普森采样算法在最小化实验成本的同时恢复广告效果,理论和实验均验证了其优越性。

摘要:

实时竞价(RTB)系统利用拍卖将用户曝光分配给相互竞争的广告商,在数字广告领域持续取得成功。评估此类广告的效果在研究和实践中仍然是一项挑战。本文提出了一种新方法,对通过此类机制购买的广告进行因果推断。利用第一价格和第二价格拍卖的经济结构,我们首先证明广告效果可以通过最优出价来识别。因此,由于这些最优出价是唯一需要恢复的对象,我们引入了一种自适应汤普森采样(TS)算法来解决多臂老虎机问题,该算法能够成功恢复此类出价,从而在最小化实验成本的同时恢复广告效果。我们为算法推导了一个阶数最优的遗憾界,并使用来自RTB拍卖的数据表明,该算法优于常用的广告效果估计方法。

英文摘要:

Real-time bidding (RTB) systems, which utilize auctions to allocate user impressions to competing advertisers, continue to enjoy success in digital advertising. Assessing the effectiveness of such advertising remains a challenge in research and practice. This paper proposes a new approach to perform causal inference on advertising bought through such mechanisms. Leveraging the economic structure of first- and second-price auctions, we first show that the effects of advertising are identified by the optimal bids. Hence, since these optimal bids are the only objects that need to be recovered, we introduce an adapted Thompson sampling (TS) algorithm to solve a multi-armed bandit problem that succeeds in recovering such bids and, consequently, the effects of advertising while minimizing the costs of experimentation. We derive a regret bound for our algorithm which is order optimal and use data from RTB auctions to show that it outperforms commonly used methods that estimate the effects of advertising.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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