We consider a multi-agent resource allocation setting that models the assignment of papers to reviewers. A recurring issue in allocation problems is the compatibility of welfare/efficiency and fairness. Given an oracle to find a welfare-achieving allocation, we embed such an oracle into a flexible algorithm called the Constrained Round Robin (CRR) algorithm, that achieves the required welfare level. Our algorithm also allows the system designer to lower the welfare requirements in order to achieve a higher degree of fairness. If the welfare requirement is lowered enough, a strengthening of envy-freeness up to one item is guaranteed. Hence, our algorithm can be viewed as a computationally efficient way to interpolate between welfare and approximate envy-freeness in allocation problems.
In this paper we have used one 2 variable Boolean function called Rule 6 to define another beautiful transformation named as Extended Rule-6. Using this function we have explored the algebraic beauties and its application to an efficient Round Robin Tournament (RRT) routine for 2k (k is any natural number) number of teams. At the end, we have thrown some light towards any number of teams of the form nk where n, k are natural numbers.
University of Waterloo（滑铁卢大学）；NICTA（澳大利亚国家信息与通信技术研究院）；UNSW（新南威尔士大学）
In sports competitions, teams can manipulate the result by, for instance, throwing games. We show that we can decide how to manipulate round robin and cup competitions, two of the most popular types of sporting competitions in polynomial time. In addition, we show that finding the minimal number of games that need to be thrown to manipulate the result can also be determined in polynomial time. Finally, we show that there are several different variations of standard cup competitions where manipulation remains polynomial.
We propose a new tournament structure that combines the popular knockout tournaments and the round-robin tournaments. As opposed to the extremes of divisive elimination and no elimination, our tournament aims to eliminate the participants as linearly as possible as a form of subtractive elimination. Our design is flexible in the sense that it can be adapted to any number of players $N$ and any number of matches $M$. Our design satisfies many properties that are desirable for a tournament to select a winner and can be adapted to rank all the participating players.
In this paper the results of a simulation of a prisoner's dilemma robin-round tournament are presented. In the tournament each participating strategy plays an iterated prisoner's dilemma against each other strategy (round-robin) and as a variant also against itself. The participants of a tournament are all strategies that are deterministic and have the same size of memory with regard to their own and their opponent's past actions: up to three most recent actions of their opponent and up to two most recent actions of their own. A focus is set on the investigation of the influence of the number …
Fair allocation of indivisible goods has attracted extensive attention over the last two decades, yielding numerous elegant algorithmic results and producing challenging open questions. The problem becomes much harder in the presence of strategic agents. Ideally, one would want to design truthful mechanisms that produce allocations with fairness guarantees. However, in the standard setting without monetary transfers, it is generally impossible to have truthful mechanisms that provide non-trivial fairness guarantees. Recently, Amanatidis et al. [2021] suggested the study of mechanisms that prod…
Virginia Tech（弗吉尼亚理工大学）；The Ohio State University（俄亥俄州立大学）
In this paper, we study the problem of fair worker selection in Federated Learning systems, where fairness serves as an incentive mechanism that encourages more workers to participate in the federation. Considering the achieved training accuracy of the global model as the utility of the selected workers, which is typically a monotone submodular function, we formulate the worker selection problem as a new multi-round monotone submodular maximization problem with cardinality and fairness constraints. The objective is to maximize the time-average utility over multiple rounds subject to an additio…
We design online algorithms for the fair allocation of public goods to a set of $N$ agents over a sequence of $T$ rounds and focus on improving their performance using predictions. In the basic model, a public good arrives in each round, the algorithm learns every agent's value for the good, and must irrevocably decide the amount of investment in the good without exceeding a total budget of $B$ across all rounds. The algorithm can utilize (potentially inaccurate) predictions of each agent's total value for all the goods to arrive. We measure the performance of the algorithm using a proportiona…
We consider a novel setting where a set of items are matched to the same set of agents repeatedly over multiple rounds. Each agent gets exactly one item per round, which brings interesting challenges to finding efficient and/or fair {\em repeated matchings}. A particular feature of our model is that the value of an agent for an item in some round depends on the number of rounds in which the item has been used by the agent in the past. We present a set of positive and negative results about the efficiency and fairness of repeated matchings. For example, when items are goods, a variation of the …
We design a mechanism for Fair and Efficient Distribution of Resources (FEDoR) in the presence of strategic agents. We consider a multiple-instances, Bayesian setting, where in each round the preference of an agent over the set of resources is a private information. We assume that in each of r rounds n agents are competing for k non-identical indivisible goods, (n > k). In each round the strategic agents declare how much they value receiving any of the goods in the specific round. The agent declaring the highest valuation receives the good with the highest value, the agent with the second high…
University of Maryland（马里兰大学）；Brown University（布朗大学）；Washington University in St. Louis（华盛顿大学圣路易斯分校）
本文改进了EF1分配的并行算法，针对2个代理人的情况，将深度从O(log²m)改进到O(logm)，并将工作量从O(m logm)减少到O(m)。同时，算法被推广到任意常数数量的代理人，并提出了随机算法，具有O(m/n)的深度和多项式工作量。此外，本文还展示了计算k≈√m的 envy-free up to k goods 分配在RNC中是可能的，或在子线性深度中对于任何常数ε>0，k=m^ε。
It is often beneficial for agents to pool their resources in order to better accommodate fluctuations in individual demand. Many multi-round resource allocation mechanisms operate in an online manner: in each round, the agents specify their demands for that round, and the mechanism determines a corresponding allocation. In this paper, we focus instead on the offline setting in which the agents specify their demand for each round at the outset. We formulate a specific resource allocation problem in this setting, and design and analyze an associated mechanism based on the solution concept of lex…
We generalize the classic problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to the problem of \emph{fair public decision making}, in which a decision must be made on several social issues simultaneously, and, unlike the classic setting, a decision can provide positive utility to multiple players. We extend the popular fairness notion of proportionality (which is not guaranteeable) to our more general setting, and introduce three novel relaxations --- \emph{proportionality up to one issue, round robin share, and pessimistic proportional share} --- that are also interesting in the classic goods all…
University of Virginia（弗吉尼亚大学）；University of Toronto（多伦多大学）
We introduce a new model for two-sided matching which allows us to borrow popular fairness notions from the fair division literature such as envy-freeness up to one good and maximin share guarantee. In our model, each agent is matched to multiple agents on the other side over whom she has additive preferences. We demand fairness for each side separately, giving rise to notions such as double envy-freeness up to one match (DEF1) and double maximin share guarantee (DMMS). We show that (a slight strengthening of) DEF1 cannot always be achieved, but in the special case where both sides have identi…
We consider the problem of dividing limited resources to individuals arriving over $T$ rounds. Each round has a random number of individuals arrive, and individuals can be characterized by their type (i.e. preferences over the different resources). A standard notion of 'fairness' in this setting is that an allocation simultaneously satisfy envy-freeness and efficiency. The former is an individual guarantee, requiring that each agent prefers their own allocation over the allocation of any other; in contrast, efficiency is a global property, requiring that the allocations clear the available res…
