基于扩散的分子通信系统中基于信道脉冲响应的物理层认证
Channel Impulse Response-based Physical Layer Authentication in a Diffusion-based Molecular Communication System
摘要：
考虑一个活跃的恶意纳米节点（Eve）对基于扩散的分子通信（DbMC）系统的模仿攻击-Eve在空闲时隙期间发送，以欺骗纳米接收器（Bob），她确实是合法的纳米发送器（Alice）。为此，这项工作利用三维（3D）信道脉冲响应（CIR）与$L$水龙头作为设备指纹认证的纳米发射机在每个时隙。具体地，Bob利用Alice的CIR作为地面事实来构造二元假设检验，以系统地接受/拒绝在每个时隙中接收的数据。仿真结果突出了模仿攻击所带来的巨大挑战-即，不可能同时最小化两个错误概率。换句话说，人们需要容忍一种错误类型，以便最小化另一种错误类型。
英文摘要：
Consider impersonation attack by an active malicious nano node (Eve) on a diffusion based molecular communication (DbMC) system---Eve transmits during the idle slots to deceive the nano receiver (Bob) that she is indeed the legitimate nano transmitter (Alice). To this end, this work exploits the 3-dimensional (3D) channel impulse response (CIR) with $L$ taps as device fingerprint for authentication of the nano transmitter during each slot. Specifically, Bob utilizes the Alice's CIR as ground truth to construct a binary hypothesis test to systematically accept/reject the data received in each slot. Simulation results highlight the great challenge posed by impersonation attack--i.e., it is not possible to simultaneously minimize the two error probabilities. In other words, one needs to tolerate on one error type in order to minimize the other error type.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
