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arXiv 2402.05159cs.CReess.SP
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地面广播攻击的威胁与局限性

Threats and Limitations of Terrestrial Broadcast Attacks

Benjamin Michele, Ivan Pena, Pablo Angueira

AI总结:

针对DVB标准缺乏认证和完整性保护,提出恶意广播攻击概念验证,并实验证明其因同信道保护比而范围受限,开发了低成本CCPR测定和攻击范围测量方法。

摘要:

DVB标准并未强制要求对传输流使用认证和完整性保护。这使得恶意第三方能够通过压制地面传输来替换合法广播。恶意信号随后可传送恶意广播流,以利用范围内智能电视(STV)的安全漏洞。我们实现了一种基于恶意混合广播宽带电视应用的概念验证攻击,能够在不到10秒内通过空中获得对STV的永久系统级访问权限。然而,由于所需的同信道保护比(CCPR),这些攻击在范围上受到严重限制,这与先前出版物直接矛盾。我们通过实验室实验、广泛模拟和现场测量提供了这些限制的证据。为此,我们开发了一种自动化的低成本CCPR测定方法,以及一种基于间隙填充器及其产生的信道冲激响应的非破坏性攻击范围测量方法。

英文摘要:

The DVB standard does not mandate the use of authentication and integrity protection for transport streams. This allows malicious third parties to replace legitimate broadcasts by overpowering terrestrial transmissions. The rogue signal can then deliver a malicious broadcast stream to exploit security vulnerabilities on Smart TVs (STVs) in range. We implemented a proof-of-concept attack based on a malicious Hybrid Broadcast Broadband TV app, able to acquire permanent system-level access to an STV over the air, in less than 10 s. These attacks, however, are severely limited in range due to required co-channel protection ratios (CCPRs), which is in direct contradiction to previous publications. We present evidence for these limitations in form of laboratory experiments, extensive simulations, and field measurements. To this end, we developed an automated, low-cost method for CCPR determination, as well as a method for non-disruptive attack range measurements based on a gap filler and the resulting channel impulse response.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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