具有社会互动的离散选择模型中的需求与福利分析
Demand and Welfare Analysis in Discrete Choice Models with Social Interactions
AI总结：
本文针对含社会互动的二元选择需求模型，建立大博弈计量经济学与Brock-Durlauf模型的联系，证明选择数据可预测反事实需求却不足以识别福利，并给出无分布福利界。
摘要：
许多现实中的消费者选择情境都涉及社会互动，导致定向政策产生溢出效应。本文开发了新颖的实证工具，用于分析在具有社会互动的二元选择情境中政策干预的需求和福利效应，例子包括对健康产品采用的补贴以及就读高成就学校的代金券。我们在I.I.D.和空间相关不可观测因素两种情形下，建立了大博弈计量经济学与Brock-Durlauf型互动模型之间的联系。在递增域空间渐近条件下，我们为相关信念和偏好参数估计量发展了新的收敛结果。接下来，我们表明，即使具有完全参数化设定和唯一均衡，足以在互动下进行反事实需求预测的选择数据，也不足以进行福利计算。这是因为产生相同互动系数的不同潜在机制，可能意味着政策干预带来不同的福利效应和无谓损失。标准指数约束意味着福利的无分布界。我们使用肯尼亚农村蚊帐采用的实验数据说明了我们的结果。
英文摘要：
Many real-life settings of consumer-choice involve social interactions, causing targeted policies to have spillover-effects. This paper develops novel empirical tools for analyzing demand and welfare-effects of policy-interventions in binary choice settings with social interactions. Examples include subsidies for health-product adoption and vouchers for attending a high-achieving school. We establish the connection between econometrics of large games and Brock-Durlauf-type interaction models, under both I.I.D. and spatially correlated unobservables. We develop new convergence results for associated beliefs and estimates of preference-parameters under increasing-domain spatial asymptotics. Next, we show that even with fully parametric specifications and unique equilibrium, choice data, that are sufficient for counterfactual demand-prediction under interactions, are insufficient for welfare-calculations. This is because distinct underlying mechanisms producing the same interaction coefficient can imply different welfare-effects and deadweight-loss from a policy-intervention. Standard index-restrictions imply distribution-free bounds on welfare. We illustrate our results using experimental data on mosquito-net adoption in rural Kenya.
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