arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1904.03322cs.GT
收藏

带宽分配的最优Nash均衡

Optimal Nash Equilibria for Bandwidth Allocation

Benjamin Plaut

摘要:

在带宽分配中,竞争代理希望沿着网络中的链路路径传输数据,并且每个代理的效用等于她在所期望的路径中的所有链路中接收的最小带宽。我们提出了一个经典的交易站机制的非线性变体,并表明,几乎整个家庭的CES福利函数(其中包括最大最小福利,纳什福利,功利福利),我们的机制的每个纳什均衡是最优的。我们还证明了这个问题的完全strategyproof机制是不可能的一般情况下,除了最大最小的福利。更广泛地说,我们的工作表明,即使是很小的修改(如允许非线性约束)也可以显着增加市场机制的力量,如贸易站。

英文摘要:

In bandwidth allocation, competing agents wish to transmit data along paths of links in a network, and each agent's utility is equal to the minimum bandwidth she receives among all links in her desired path. Recent market mechanisms for this problem have either focused on only Nash welfare, or ignored strategic behavior. We propose a nonlinear variant of the classic trading post mechanism, and show that for almost the entire family of CES welfare functions (which includes maxmin welfare, Nash welfare, and utilitarian welfare), every Nash equilibrium of our mechanism is optimal. We also prove that fully strategyproof mechanisms for this problem are impossible in general, with the exception of maxmin welfare. More broadly, our work shows that even small modifications (such as allowing nonlinear constraints) can dramatically increase the power of market mechanisms like trading post.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑