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arXiv 1809.04362cs.AI
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具有限制偏好的流动民主中的迭代委托

Iterative Delegations in Liquid Democracy with Restricted Preferences

Sorbonne Université(索邦大学);CNRS(法国国家科学研究中心);Gran Sasso Science Institute(格兰萨索科学研究所);EDF R&D(法国电力研发中心)

Bruno Escoffier, Hugo Gilbert, Adèle Pass-Lanneau

摘要:

本文研究的是介于直接民主和代议制民主之间的一种集体决策范式--流动民主。流动民主的一个主要特征是选民可以以一种传递的方式委托他们的选票,这样:A代表B,B代表C,导致A代表C。不幸的是,这个过程可能不会收敛,因为甚至可能不存在稳态(也称为平衡)。在本文中,我们研究了在流动民主中,当选民对代表他们的代理人有限制类型的偏好时(例如,单峰偏好)。我们表明,各种自然结构的偏好保证存在一个平衡,我们得到了一些理想的性能计算几个平衡的问题的易处理性和硬度的结果。

英文摘要:

In this paper, we study liquid democracy, a collective decision making paradigm which lies between direct and representative democracy. One main feature of liquid democracy is that voters can delegate their votes in a transitive manner so that: A delegates to B and B delegates to C leads to A delegates to C. Unfortunately, this process may not converge as there may not even exist a stable state (also called equilibrium). In this paper, we investigate the stability of the delegation process in liquid democracy when voters have restricted types of preference on the agent representing them (e.g., single-peaked preferences). We show that various natural structures of preferences guarantee the existence of an equilibrium and we obtain both tractability and hardness results for the problem of computing several equilibria with some desirable properties.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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