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arXiv 1809.02629cs.CR
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联觉:通过远程声学侧通道检测屏幕内容

Synesthesia: Detecting Screen Content via Remote Acoustic Side Channels

Daniel Genkin, Mihir Pattani, Roei Schuster, Eran Tromer

摘要:

我们表明,从计算机屏幕内发出的细微的声学噪声可以用来检测屏幕上显示的内容。这种声音可以被内置在网络摄像头或屏幕中的普通麦克风拾取,并无意中传输到其他方,例如,视频会议电话或存档录音中。它也可以通过放置在屏幕旁边的桌子上的智能手机或“智能扬声器”进行记录,或者使用抛物面麦克风从10米远的地方进行记录。通过实证演示各种攻击场景,我们展示了如何使用此通道实时检测屏幕上的文本,或用户输入到屏幕上的虚拟键盘。我们还演示了攻击者如何分析视频通话期间接收到的音频(例如,在Google Hangout上)来推断另一方是否正在浏览网页而不是观看视频通话,以及哪个网站显示在他们的屏幕上。

英文摘要:

We show that subtle acoustic noises emanating from within computer screens can be used to detect the content displayed on the screens. This sound can be picked up by ordinary microphones built into webcams or screens, and is inadvertently transmitted to other parties, e.g., during a videoconference call or archived recordings. It can also be recorded by a smartphone or "smart speaker" placed on a desk next to the screen, or from as far as 10 meters away using a parabolic microphone. Empirically demonstrating various attack scenarios, we show how this channel can be used for real-time detection of on-screen text, or users' input into on-screen virtual keyboards. We also demonstrate how an attacker can analyze the audio received during video call (e.g., on Google Hangout) to infer whether the other side is browsing the web in lieu of watching the video call, and which web site is displayed on their screen.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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