发表机构
Fraunhofer Portugal AICOS（弗劳恩霍夫葡萄牙AICOS）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本文探讨TEMPEST电磁侧信道攻击对巴西电子投票机选票保密性的威胁，提出攻击场景，并通过实验验证其有效性，最后给出缓解风险的意识指导方针。
AI 中文摘要
本文研究了电磁侧信道攻击（又称TEMPEST攻击）对巴西电子投票机（UEB）中选票保密性构成的威胁。在这类攻击中，攻击者可通过拦截与目标设备视频信号相关的电磁辐射，远程重建屏幕内容。本工作源于巴西选举法院近期关于利用电子设备企图侵犯选票保密性的裁决。基于公开可获取的选举系统信息，本文提出了针对投票站的攻击场景。使用软件定义无线电的实验表明，TEMPEST攻击的有效性在很大程度上取决于公众对该威胁缺乏认识所导致的监督缺失。最后，本文为选民、投票站工作人员和政党代表提出了提高意识的指导方针，以减轻投票站内的攻击风险。
英文摘要
This paper investigates the threat to ballot secrecy in the Brazilian electronic voting machine (UEB) posed by electromagnetic side-channel attacks, also known as TEMPEST attacks. In these attacks, screen content can be reconstructed remotely by intercepting electromagnetic emanations associated with the target device's video signal. This work is motivated by a recent ruling by a Brazilian electoral court concerning an attempt to violate ballot secrecy using electronic equipment. Based on publicly available information about the electoral system, attack scenarios against polling stations are proposed. Experiments using software-defined radio show that the effectiveness of TEMPEST attacks strongly depends on the lack of oversight resulting from public unawareness of the threat. Finally, awareness guidelines are proposed for voters, poll workers, and party representatives to mitigate attack risks within a polling station.
CommentsEnglish version of work originally published in Portuguese in the XXVI Proceedings of the Brazilian Symposium on Cybersecurity (SBSEG), 2026
Journal refBrazilian Symposium on Cybersecurity (SBSEG), 2026
