PreLatPUF：利用DRAM延迟变化生成稳健的设备签名
PreLatPUF: Exploiting DRAM Latency Variations for Generating Robust Device Signatures
摘要：
物理不可克隆函数（PUF）是在低成本密码应用中生成唯一且更安全的密钥的潜在安全块。动态随机存取存储器（DRAM）已被提出作为一个有前途的候选人产生强大的密钥。不幸的是，从DRAM生成设备签名的现有技术非常慢、具有破坏性（破坏当前数据）并且对系统操作具有破坏性。在本文中，我们提出了\textit{precharge}延迟为基础的PUF（PreLatPUF），利用DRAM \textit{precharge}延迟变化生成签名。所提出的PreLatPUF是快速、稳健、破坏性最小且非破坏性的。来自不同制造商的市售$DDR3$芯片的硅结果表明，所提出的密钥生成技术至少比现有方法快$ \sim 1,192X$，同时在极端操作条件下可靠地再现密钥。
英文摘要：
Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are potential security blocks to generate unique and more secure keys in low-cost cryptographic applications. Dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) has been proposed as one of the promising candidates for generating robust keys. Unfortunately, the existing techniques of generating device signatures from DRAM is very slow, destructive (destroy the current data), and disruptive to system operation. In this paper, we propose \textit{precharge} latency-based PUF (PreLatPUF) that exploits DRAM \textit{precharge} latency variations to generate signatures. The proposed PreLatPUF is fast, robust, least disruptive, and non-destructive. The silicon results from commercially available $DDR3$ chips from different manufacturers show that the proposed key generation technique is at least $ \sim 1,192X$ faster than the existing approaches, while reliably reproducing the key in extreme operating conditions.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
