基于群体的资格制度的激励（不）兼容性
The incentive (in)compatibility of group-based qualification systems
摘要：
比赛组织者应该设计规则，这样一支球队就不能通过付出更少的努力来获得更好的结果。然而，最近的国际足联足球世界杯欧洲资格赛是众所周知的，违反这一要求，这激发了我们的研究类似的基于组的资格制度的激励兼容性。给出了策略防性的充分必要条件，并应用于FIFA世界杯和UEFA欧洲锦标赛足球资格赛的分类。提出了两种合理的机制来解决激励不相容的问题：第一种是基于废除匿名的比赛从不同的组的比较中丢弃，而第二种涉及到重新思考的播种程序。我们的研究结果对主要体育运动的管理机构具有有益的启示。
英文摘要：
Tournament organisers supposedly design rules such that a team cannot be strictly better off by exerting a lower effort. However, the European qualification tournaments for recent FIFA soccer World Cups are known to violate this requirement, which inspires our study on the incentive compatibility of similar group-based qualification systems. Theorems listing the sufficient and necessary conditions of strategy-proofness are provided and applied to classify several soccer qualification tournaments for FIFA World Cups and UEFA European Championships. Two reasonable mechanisms are proposed to solve the problem of incentive incompatibility: the first is based on abolishing the anonymity of the matches discarded in the comparison of teams from different groups, while the second involves a rethinking of the seeding procedure. Our results have useful implications for the governing bodies of major sports.
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