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arXiv 1803.07053math.OC
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攻击恢复H2、H ∞和L1状态估计器

Attack-Resilient H2, H-infinity, and L1 State Estimator

Yorie Nakahira, Yilin Mo

摘要:

研究了稀疏传感器完整性攻击下噪声系统的安全状态估计问题。我们展示了一个基本的限制:即,2 r-可检测性是实现有界估计误差所必需的,其中r是攻击的数量。这个条件比文献中通常假设的2 r-可观测性条件弱。相反,我们提出了一个实时的状态估计器,实现的基本限制。建议的状态估计器的灵感来自鲁棒控制和FDI:即,它包括本地Luenberger估计器,本地残差检测器,和一个全球融合过程。我们展示了它对H2,H-无穷大和L1系统的性能保证。最后,数值例子表明,它有相对较低的估计误差在现有的算法和平均计算时间的系统与足够少的妥协的传感器。

英文摘要:

This paper considers the secure state estimation problem for noisy systems in the presence of sparse sensor integrity attacks. We show a fundamental limitation: that is, 2r-detectability is necessary for achieving bounded estimation errors, where r is the number of attacks. This condition is weaker than the 2r-observability condition typically assumed in the literature. Conversely, we propose a real-time state estimator that achieves the fundamental limitation. The proposed state estimator is inspired by robust control and FDI: that is, it consists of local Luenberger estimators, local residual detectors, and a global fusion process. We show its performance guarantees for H2, H-infinity, and L1 systems. Finally, numerical examples show that it has relatively low estimation errors among existing algorithms and average computation time for systems with a sufficiently small number of compromised sensors.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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