SCADA能量管理系统的网络安全研究--对状态估计器的隐蔽欺骗攻击
A Cyber Security Study of a SCADA Energy Management System: Stealthy Deception Attacks on the State Estimator
摘要:
电力网络是当今社会的重要基础设施,因此其安全可靠的运行备受关注。状态估计器通常用于电力网络中,例如,以检测故障设备并最优地路由功率流。估计器通常位于控制中心,通过未加密的通信信道将大量测量值发送到控制中心。因此,状态估计器的网络安全成为一个重要的问题。在本文中,我们分析了网络安全的状态估计器在监控和数据采集(SCADA)的能量管理系统(EMS)运行的电力网络。当前EMS状态估计算法具有不良数据检测(BDD)方案以检测测量数据中的异常值。这种方案基于高测量冗余。虽然这些方法可以检测一组基本的网络攻击,但它们可能在智能攻击者存在的情况下失败。我们探讨后者考虑的情况下,通过发送虚假信息的控制中心进行隐形欺骗攻击。首先,我们提出了一个最近的框架,其特征在于攻击作为一个最优化问题的目标指定通过一个安全度量和相应的攻击成本的约束。该框架是用来进行现实的实验,一个国家的最先进的SCADA EMS软件的电力网络的例子,14个变电站,27个总线,和40个分支机构。结果表明,如何状态估计器的电力网络可以更有弹性的网络安全攻击。
英文摘要:
The electrical power network is a critical infrastructure in today's society, so its safe and reliable operation is of major concern. State estimators are commonly used in power networks, for example, to detect faulty equipment and to optimally route power flows. The estimators are often located in control centers, to which large numbers of measurements are sent over unencrypted communication channels. Therefore cyber security for state estimators becomes an important issue. In this paper we analyze the cyber security of state estimators in supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) for energy management systems (EMS) operating the power network. Current EMS state estimation algorithms have bad data detection (BDD) schemes to detect outliers in the measurement data. Such schemes are based on high measurement redundancy. Although these methods may detect a set of basic cyber attacks, they may fail in the presence of an intelligent attacker. We explore the latter by considering scenarios where stealthy deception attacks are performed by sending false information to the control center. We begin by presenting a recent framework that characterizes the attack as an optimization problem with the objective specified through a security metric and constraints corresponding to the attack cost. The framework is used to conduct realistic experiments on a state-of-the-art SCADA EMS software for a power network example with 14 substations, 27 buses, and 40 branches. The results indicate how state estimators for power networks can be made more resilient to cyber security attacks.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。