未经验证的专业知识
Eliciting Expertise without Verification
摘要:
众包的一个核心问题是如何从代理商那里获得专业知识。当答案无法直接验证时,这就更加困难。一个关键的挑战是,复杂的代理人可能会战略性地隐瞒努力或信息,当他们认为他们的回报将基于与其他代理人的报告可能会忽略这一信息,由于缺乏努力或专业知识的比较。我们的工作定义了一个自然的模型,这种设置的基础上的假设,\emph{more sophisticated agents know the beliefs of less sophisticated agents}。然后,我们提供了一个机制设计框架,这种设置。从这个框架中,我们设计了几个新的机制,无论是单一的和多个问题的设置,(1)鼓励代理投资的努力,诚实地提供他们的信息;(2)输出一个正确的“层次结构”的信息时,代理是理性的。
英文摘要:
A central question of crowd-sourcing is how to elicit expertise from agents. This is even more difficult when answers cannot be directly verified. A key challenge is that sophisticated agents may strategically withhold effort or information when they believe their payoff will be based upon comparison with other agents whose reports will likely omit this information due to lack of effort or expertise. Our work defines a natural model for this setting based on the assumption that \emph{more sophisticated agents know the beliefs of less sophisticated agents}. We then provide a mechanism design framework for this setting. From this framework, we design several novel mechanisms, for both the single and multiple question settings, that (1) encourage agents to invest effort and provide their information honestly; (2) output a correct "hierarchy" of the information when agents are rational.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。