去中心化众包中的无验证信息 elicitation
Information Elicitation from Decentralized Crowd Without Verification
AI总结：
本文研究无验证的去中心化众包信息 elicitation，建模为两阶段博弈，分析三种激励分配机制，发现 SV 机制在价值评估异构时能实现不低于其他机制的准确性和社会福利。
摘要：
无验证信息 elicitation (IEWV) 指的是当真实答案无法验证时，从众包成员中 eliciting 高精度解决方案的问题。高精度的团队解决方案（由成员解决方案聚合而成）需要成员付出努力，而这种努力应得到适当激励。以往关于 IEWV 的研究主要关注存在中心实体（如众包平台）提供激励以激励众包成员的场景。然而，所提出的设计并不适用于不存在中心实体的实际场景。本文研究了被忽视的去中心化 IEWV 场景，其中众包成员既充当激励贡献者又充当任务解决者。我们将具有异构团队解决方案价值评估的成员之间的互动建模为一个两阶段博弈，其中每个成员在第一阶段决定其激励贡献策略，在第二阶段决定其努力付出策略。我们分析了在三种激励分配机制下成员的均衡行为：平均分配（EA）、输出一致性（OA）和沙普利值（SV）。我们证明，在任何分配机制下的均衡中，低价值评估成员付出的努力不超过高价值评估成员。反直觉的是，在 SV 下的均衡中，低价值评估成员为协作提供激励，而高价值评估成员则不提供。这是因为高价值评估成员更看重聚合的团队解决方案，因此需要更少的激励来付出努力。此外，当成员的价值评估足够异构时，SV 带来的团队解决方案准确性和社会福利不低于 EA 和 OA。
英文摘要：
Information Elicitation Without Verification (IEWV) refers to the problem of eliciting high-accuracy solutions from crowd members when the ground truth is unverifiable. A high-accuracy team solution (aggregated from members' solutions) requires members' effort exertion, which should be incentivized properly. Previous research on IEWV mainly focused on scenarios where a central entity (e.g., the crowdsourcing platform) provides incentives to motivate crowd members. Still, the proposed designs do not apply to practical situations where no central entity exists. This paper studies the overlooked decentralized IEWV scenario, where crowd members act as both incentive contributors and task solvers. We model the interactions among members with heterogeneous team solution accuracy valuations as a two-stage game, where each member decides her incentive contribution strategy in Stage 1 and her effort exertion strategy in Stage 2. We analyze members' equilibrium behaviors under three incentive allocation mechanisms: Equal Allocation (EA), Output Agreement (OA), and Shapley Value (SV). We show that at an equilibrium under any allocation mechanism, a low-valuation member exerts no more effort than a high-valuation member. Counter-intuitively, a low-valuation member provides incentives to the collaboration while a high-valuation member does not at an equilibrium under SV. This is because a high-valuation member who values the aggregated team solution more needs fewer incentives to exert effort. In addition, when members' valuations are sufficiently heterogeneous, SV leads to team solution accuracy and social welfare no smaller than EA and OA.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
