arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1802.08138cs.AIcs.GTcs.SYeess.SY
收藏

非合作环境中的可靠交叉口控制

Reliable Intersection Control in Non-cooperative Environments

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign(伊利诺伊大学厄巴纳-香槟分校);Toyota InfoTechnology Center(丰田信息技术中心)

Muhammed O. Sayin, Chung-Wei Lin, Shinichi Shiraishi, Tamer Başar

AI总结:

本文提出一种可靠交叉口控制机制,用于非合作环境中的战略自主和联网车辆。通过分析车辆的战略行为,确定纳什均衡,并识别社会最优均衡以实现公平分配。

摘要:

我们提出了一种可靠的交叉口控制机制,用于战略自主和联网车辆(智能体)在非合作环境中。每个智能体可以获取其最早可能和期望的通过时间,并向交叉口管理者报告通过时间,管理者按先到先得的原则分配交叉口时间。然而,智能体可能有冲突利益并采取策略性行为。为此,我们分析智能体的战略行为,并为所有可能场景制定纳什均衡。此外,在所有纳什均衡中,我们识别出一个社会最优均衡,以实现公平的交叉口分配,并相应地描述一种策略证明的交叉口机制,该机制实现了可靠的交叉口控制,使得策略性智能体没有动机策略性地报告他们的通过时间。

英文摘要:

We propose a reliable intersection control mechanism for strategic autonomous and connected vehicles (agents) in non-cooperative environments. Each agent has access to his/her earliest possible and desired passing times, and reports a passing time to the intersection manager, who allocates the intersection temporally to the agents in a First-Come-First-Serve basis. However, the agents might have conflicting interests and can take actions strategically. To this end, we analyze the strategic behaviors of the agents and formulate Nash equilibria for all possible scenarios. Furthermore, among all Nash equilibria we identify a socially optimal equilibrium that leads to a fair intersection allocation, and correspondingly we describe a strategy-proof intersection mechanism, which achieves reliable intersection control such that the strategic agents do not have any incentive to misreport their passing times strategically.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑