高峰时段返现计划中的理性消费决策
Rational consumer decisions in a peak time rebate program
AI总结：
本文研究了消费者在参与高峰时段返现计划时的理性决策，采用多阶段随机规划模型分析其在不确定性下的最优消费策略，发现消费者会根据经济激励调整基线以增加福利。
摘要：
本文分析了消费者在参与基于基线的高峰时段返现（PTR）机制时的理性行为。从需求侧提出多阶段随机规划模型，将消费者偏好建模为风险规避函数，考虑加性不确定性。消费者在每个时期选择最优消费方案以最大化经济利益。通过逆向求解随机优化问题，发现当存在经济激励时，理性消费者会调整基线以增加福利。结果表明，无论激励是否低于零售价，用户都会将负载转移到基线设置时期；若激励高于常规电价，用户则在基线设置时期消耗最大可能能量并减少PTR时段的消耗。这种行为导致总能耗增加。此外，当激励低于零售价时，高不确定性用户比可预测用户消耗更少能量。
英文摘要：
A rational behavior of a consumer is analyzed when the user participates in a Peak Time Rebate (PTR) mechanism, which is a demand response (DR) incentive program based on a baseline. A multi-stage stochastic programming is proposed from the demand side in order to understand the rational decisions. The consumer preferences are modeled as a risk-averse function under additive uncertainty. The user chooses the optimal consumption profile to maximize his economic benefits for each period. The stochastic optimization problem is solved backward in time. A particular situation is developed when the System Operator (SO) uses consumption of the previous interval as the household-specific baseline for the DR program. It is found that a rational consumer alters the baseline in order to increase the well-being when there is an economic incentive. As results, whether the incentive is lower than the retail price, the user shifts his load requirement to the baseline setting period. On the other hand, if the incentive is greater than the regular energy price, the optimal decision is that the user spends the maximum possible energy in the baseline setting period and reduces the consumption at the PTR time. This consumer behavior produces more energy consumption in total considering all periods. In addition, the user with high uncertainty level in his energy pattern should spend less energy than a predictable consumer when the incentive is lower than the retail price.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
