This paper introduces epistemic graphs as a generalization of the epistemic approach to probabilistic argumentation. In these graphs, an argument can be believed or disbelieved up to a given degree, thus providing a more fine--grained alternative to the standard Dung's approaches when it comes to determining the status of a given argument. Furthermore, the flexibility of the epistemic approach allows us to both model the rationale behind the existing semantics as well as completely deviate from them when required. Epistemic graphs can model both attack and support as well as relations that are neither support nor attack. The way other arguments influence a given argument is expressed by the epistemic constraints that can restrict the belief we have in an argument with a varying degree of specificity. The fact that we can specify the rules under which arguments should be evaluated and we can include constraints between unrelated arguments permits the framework to be more context--sensitive. It also allows for better modelling of imperfect agents, which can be important in multi--agent applications.
Dynamic Term-Modal Logics for First-Order Epistemic Planning
DTU Compute, Technical University of Denmark（丹麦技术大学DTU计算学院）；London School of Economics（伦敦政治经济学院）；Center for Information and Bubble Studies, University of Copenhagen（哥本哈根大学信息与泡沫研究中心）
Handling Epistemic and Aleatory Uncertainties in Probabilistic Circuits
Università degli Studi di Brescia（布雷西亚大学）；Cardiff University（卡迪夫大学）；CCDC Army Research Laboratory（CCDC陆军研究实验室）；KU Leuven（鲁汶大学）；Blue Prism AI Labs（蓝棱镜人工智能实验室）；Ozyegin University（奥兹耶金大学）
Epistemic Phase Transitions in Mathematical Proofs
Stanford University（斯坦福大学）；Carnegie Mellon University（卡内基梅隆大学）；Santa Fe Institute（圣塔菲研究所）
数学证明既是确定性的范式，也是我们在文化记录中拥有的一些最明确合理的论点。然而，它们的明确性导致了一个悖论，因为随着论证的扩展，错误的概率呈指数级增长。当一个数学家遇到一个证明时，她是如何相信它的？在这里，我们表明，在一个认知上合理的信念形成机制结合演绎推理和溯因推理，相信数学论点可以经历我们所说的认知相变：一个戏剧性的和快速传播的跳跃，从不确定性到接近完全的信心，在合理的水平的索赔到索赔的出错率。为了证明这一点，我们分析了一个不寻常的数据集，其中包含来自形式化推理系统Coq的48个机器辅助证明，包括从古代到21世纪数学的主要定理，以及五个手工构建的案例，包括Euclid，Apollonius，Hernstein's Topics in Algebra和Andrew Wiles对Fermat's Last Theorem的证明。我们的研究结果既与数学历史和哲学中关于我们如何理解证明的最新工作有关，也与认知科学中的一个基本问题有关，即我们如何证明复杂的信念。
