实时拒绝和缓解全球定位系统上的时间同步攻击
Real-Time Rejection and Mitigation of Time Synchronization Attacks on the Global Positioning System
AI总结：
本文提出TSARM技术，用于实时检测和缓解GPS上的时间同步攻击，通过估计接收机时钟偏差和漂移并纠正，提升时间恢复性能，优于现有方法。
摘要：
本文介绍了一种用于全球定位系统（GPS）上时间同步攻击（TSAs）的拒绝和缓解技术（TSARM）。该技术估计GPS接收机的时钟偏差和漂移，以及可能的攻击，与以往方法不同。在估计攻击时间点后，对接收机的时钟偏差和漂移进行纠正。所提出的技术计算效率高，可实时实现，与标准位置、速度和时间估计算法互补。该技术在真实GPS接收机收集的数据上进行了性能评估。我们的方法实现了优异的时间恢复，符合应用需求。数值结果表明，TSARM技术在文献中优于其他方法。
英文摘要：
This paper introduces the Time Synchronization Attack Rejection and Mitigation (TSARM) technique for Time Synchronization Attacks (TSAs) over the Global Positioning System (GPS). The technique estimates the clock bias and drift of the GPS receiver along with the possible attack contrary to previous approaches. Having estimated the time instants of the attack, the clock bias and drift of the receiver are corrected. The proposed technique is computationally efficient and can be easily implemented in real time, in a fashion complementary to standard algorithms for position, velocity, and time estimation in off-the-shelf receivers. The performance of this technique is evaluated on a set of collected data from a real GPS receiver. Our method renders excellent time recovery consistent with the application requirements. The numerical results demonstrate that the TSARM technique outperforms competing approaches in the literature.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
