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arXiv 1711.04474cs.ITmath.ITmath.OCmath.PR
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沟通能力有限的说服者

Persuasion with limited communication capacity

Maël Le Treust, Tristan Tomala

摘要:

我们考虑一个贝叶斯说服问题,说服者和决策者通过一个不完美的渠道,有一个固定的和有限数量的消息,并受到外源噪声进行通信。我们提供了一个上界的说服者可以通过沟通渠道安全的回报。我们还证明了该界是紧的,即,如果说服问题由同一个基本问题的大量独立副本组成,那么说服者可以通过使用将所有问题联系在一起的策略来任意接近地实现这个界限。我们将此最佳收益描述为通信信道的信息理论容量的函数。

英文摘要:

We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where the persuader and the decision maker communicate through an imperfect channel that has a fixed and limited number of messages and is subject to exogenous noise. We provide an upper bound on the payoffs the persuader can secure by communicating through the channel. We also show that the bound is tight, i.e., if the persuasion problem consists of a large number of independent copies of the same base problem, then the persuader can achieve this bound arbitrarily closely by using strategies that tie all the problems together. We characterize this optimal payoff as a function of the information-theoretic capacity of the communication channel.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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