电力网络市场力的结构特征
A Structural Characterization of Market Power in Electric Power Networks
摘要：
我们考虑一个市场中，容量受限的发电商竞争的标量参数化的供应功能，以服务于整个传输受限的电力网络的非弹性需求。市场根据地点边际定价机制出清，独立系统运营商确定发电商的生产数量，以尽量减少满足需求的显示成本，同时确保满足网络传输和发电机容量限制。在ISO和发电商同时选择策略的程式化假设下，我们建立了基础市场纳什均衡的存在性，并导出了相对于社会最优水平的纳什均衡的分配效率损失的上界。我们还刻画了一个上限的位置边际价格的标记在纳什均衡以上的完全竞争水平。这些界限与事前市场力量监测特别相关，它揭示了某些市场结构-特别是生产者的\emph{market share}和\emph{residual supply index}-在预测生产者能够在多大程度上行使市场力量以影响市场结果，使其对自己有利方面的作用。最后，限制我们的注意力到一个两节点的电力网络的简单设置，我们提供了一个表征的市场结构下，一个布雷斯悖论发生由于市场力量的行使-也就是说，我们提供了一个关于市场结构的充分必要条件，在该条件下，网络的传输线路容量的加强导致（违反直觉的）在纳什均衡时发电总成本的增加。
英文摘要：
We consider a market in which capacity-constrained generators compete in scalar-parameterized supply functions to serve an inelastic demand spread throughout a transmission constrained power network. The market clears according to a locational marginal pricing mechanism, in which the independent system operator (ISO) determines the generators' production quantities to minimize the revealed cost of meeting demand, while ensuring that network transmission and generator capacity constraints are met. Under the stylizing assumption that both the ISO and generators choose their strategies simultaneously, we establish the existence of Nash equilibria for the underlying market, and derive an upper bound on the allocative efficiency loss at Nash equilibrium relative to the socially optimal level. We also characterize an upper bound on the markup of locational marginal prices at Nash equilibrium above their perfectly competitive levels. Of particular relevance to ex ante market power monitoring, these bounds reveal the role of certain market structures---specifically, the \emph{market share} and \emph{residual supply index} of a producer---in predicting the degree to which that producer is able to exercise market power to influence the market outcome to its advantage. Finally, restricting our attention to the simpler setting of a two-node power network, we provide a characterization of market structures under which a Braess-like paradox occurs due to the exercise of market power---that is to say, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition on market structure under which the strengthening of the network's transmission line capacity results in the (counterintuitive) increase in the total cost of generation at Nash equilibrium.
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