arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1709.07974cs.NI
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移动网络运营商基础设施共享:权衡与市场分析

Infrastructure Sharing for Mobile Network Operators: Analysis of Trade-offs and Market

Tachporn Sanguanpuak, Sudarshan Guruacharya, Ekram Hossain, Nandana Rajatheva, Matti Latva-aho

摘要:

不断增长的移动服务需求和专用频谱的未充分利用的冲突问题已经产生了一种范例,其中移动网络运营商(MNO)在它们之间共享它们的基础设施,以便降低它们的运营成本,同时增加它们现有网络资源的使用。我们建模和分析这样的基础设施共享系统考虑一个单一的买方MNO和多个卖方MNO。假设BS的位置可以被建模为一个均匀的泊松点过程,我们发现的下行链路信号干扰噪声比(SINR)覆盖概率由买方MNO在基础设施共享环境中的用户服务。我们分析了增加BS的发射功率和买方MNO所拥有的BS的强度之间的权衡,以实现给定的服务质量(QoS)的SINR覆盖概率。此外,对于卖方MNO,我们分析每单位面积的网络的功耗(即,面积功耗),其被示出为BS强度的分段连续函数,由线性函数和凸函数组成。因此,可以优化卖方MNO的BS强度以最小化区域功耗,同时实现买方MNO的最低QoS。然后,我们使用这些结果来制定一个单一的买方多卖方BS基础设施市场。买方MNO关心的是发现从哪个卖方MNO购买以及购买BS的什么部分。在卖方方面,定价和确定基础设施的销售份额的问题被制定为一个古诺寡头垄断市场。我们证明了每个卖方的最佳对策的迭代更新总是收敛到纳什均衡。

英文摘要:

The conflicting problems of growing mobile service demand and underutilization of dedicated spectrum has given rise to a paradigm where mobile network operators (MNOs) share their infrastructure among themselves in order to lower their operational costs, while at the same time increase the usage of their existing network resources. We model and analyze such an infrastructure sharing system considering a single buyer MNO and multiple seller MNOs. Assuming that the locations of the BSs can be modeled as a homogeneous Poisson point process, we find the downlink signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) coverage probability for a user served by the buyer MNO in an infrastructure sharing environment. We analyze the trade-off between increasing the transmit power of a BS and the intensity of BSs owned by the buyer MNO required to achieve a given quality-of-service (QoS) in terms of the SINR coverage probability. Also, for a seller MNO, we analyze the power consumption of the network per unit area (i.e., areal power consumption) which is shown to be a piecewise continuous function of BS intensity, composed of a linear and a convex function. Accordingly, the BS intensity of the seller MNO can be optimized to minimize the areal power consumption while achieving a minimum QoS for the buyer MNO. We then use these results to formulate a single-buyer multiple-seller BS infrastructure market. The buyer MNO is concerned with finding which seller MNO to purchase from and what fraction of BSs to purchase. On the sellers' side, the problem of pricing and determining the fraction of infrastructure to be sold is formulated as a Cournot oligopoly market. We prove that the iterative update of each seller's best response always converges to the Nash Equilibrium.

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