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arXiv 1707.06465math.OCcs.MA
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势对策中的最佳反应动力学

On Best-Response Dynamics in Potential Games

Brian Swenson, Ryan Murray, Soummya Kar

摘要:

从对策论的角度研究了(连续)最佳反应动态系统的收敛性。尽管它们在对策论中扮演着重要的角色,但由于最佳对策映射的不连续性和集值性,在许多感兴趣的对策中,人们对最佳对策动态的理解仍然很少。本文重点阐述了最佳反应动力学的几个重要性质的多智能体游戏类称为潜在的游戏-一类游戏的多智能体系统和分布式控制的根本重要性。它表明,在几乎每一个潜在的游戏,几乎每一个初始条件下,最佳反应动态(i)有一个唯一的解决方案,(ii)收敛到纯策略纳什均衡,(iii)收敛于指数率。

英文摘要:

The paper studies the convergence properties of (continuous) best-response dynamics from game theory. Despite their fundamental role in game theory, best-response dynamics are poorly understood in many games of interest due to the discontinuous, set-valued nature of the best-response map. The paper focuses on elucidating several important properties of best-response dynamics in the class of multi-agent games known as potential games---a class of games with fundamental importance in multi-agent systems and distributed control. It is shown that in almost every potential game and for almost every initial condition, the best-response dynamics (i) have a unique solution, (ii) converge to pure-strategy Nash equilibria, and (iii) converge at an exponential rate.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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