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arXiv 1612.04885cs.AIcs.GT
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预测市场中的众包结果确定

Crowdsourced Outcome Determination in Prediction Markets

Duke University(杜克大学);Microsoft Research(微软研究院)

Rupert Freeman, Sebastien Lahaie, David M. Pennock

摘要:

预测市场是一个有用的手段,聚集有关未来事件的信息。为了发挥作用,市场需要一个可信的实体,最终将验证真实的结果。受最近引入的去中心化预测市场的启发,我们引入了一种机制,该机制允许由一组仲裁者的投票决定结果,这些仲裁者本身可能持有市场的股份。尽管存在潜在的利益冲突,我们得出的条件下,我们可以激励仲裁者使用从市场费用筹集的资金来实现同行预测机制,如实投票。最后,我们研究了什么参数值可以用于我们的机制在现实世界中的实现。

英文摘要:

A prediction market is a useful means of aggregating information about a future event. To function, the market needs a trusted entity who will verify the true outcome in the end. Motivated by the recent introduction of decentralized prediction markets, we introduce a mechanism that allows for the outcome to be determined by the votes of a group of arbiters who may themselves hold stakes in the market. Despite the potential conflict of interest, we derive conditions under which we can incentivize arbiters to vote truthfully by using funds raised from market fees to implement a peer prediction mechanism. Finally, we investigate what parameter values could be used in a real-world implementation of our mechanism.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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