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arXiv 1611.06101cs.GTmath.LO
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扩展对策的相依类型

Dependent Types for Extensive Games

Pierre Lescanne

摘要:

可拓博弈是经济学中广泛使用的工具,用来描述一个群体的决策过程。在本文中,我们提出了一个形式化的表示基于证明辅助COQ,主要集中在无限广泛的游戏和他们的特点。COQ提出了一个称为“依赖类型”的特性,这意味着对象的类型可能依赖于其组件的类型。例如,代理的选择集或效用集可能取决于代理本身。使用依赖类型,我们正式描述了一个非常一般的一类博弈和策略配置文件,这对应于博弈理论家所习惯的。我们还讨论了博弈论中的无限性概念,以及如何精确描述。

英文摘要:

Extensive games are tools largely used in economics to describe decision processes ofa community of agents. In this paper we propose a formal presentation based on theproof assistant COQ which focuses mostly on infinite extensive games and theircharacteristics. COQ proposes a feature called "dependent types", which meansthat the type of an object may depend on the type of its components. For instance,the set of choices or the set of utilities of an agent may depend on the agentherself. Using dependent types, we describe formally a very general class of gamesand strategy profiles, which corresponds somewhat to what game theorists are used to.We also discuss the notions of infiniteness in game theory and how this can beprecisely described.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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