最优债务管理与破产的随机模型
A Stochastic Model of Optimal Debt Management and Bankruptcy
摘要:
将最优债务管理问题建模为无限时间范围内借款人和贷款人之间的非合作对策。借款人的年收入是由一个随机过程。当债务收入比$x(t)$达到一定的大小$x^*$时,破产立即发生。风险中性放款人收取的利率是为了补偿其投资的这种可能损失而精确确定的。对于一个给定的破产阈值$x^*$,最优反馈策略的存在性和性质的借款人进行了研究,在一个随机的框架,以及在一个有限的确定性设置。本文还分析了借款人的预期总成本如何根据$x^*$的不同值而变化,根据$x^*$的不同值而变化。
英文摘要:
A problem of optimal debt management is modeled as a noncooperative game between a borrower and a pool of lenders, in infinite time horizon with exponential discount. The yearly income of the borrower is governed by a stochastic process. When the debt-to-income ratio $x(t)$ reaches a given size $x^*$, bankruptcy instantly occurs. The interest rate charged by the risk-neutral lenders is precisely determined in order to compensate for this possible loss of their investment. For a given bankruptcy threshold $x^*$, existence and properties of optimal feedback strategies for the borrower are studied, in a stochastic framework as well as in a limit deterministic setting. The paper also analyzes how the expected total cost to the borrower changes, depending on different values of $x^*$, changes, depending on different values of $x^*$?.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。