货币贬值下的债务管理问题
A Debt Management Problem with Currency Devaluation
摘要:
我们考虑一个债务管理模型,一个主权国家与一群风险中性的竞争性外国投资者交易一些债券来偿还债务。每一次,政府都决定国内生产总值(GDP)的哪一部分必须用来偿还债务,以及货币贬值多少。这两项行动都能减少债务的实际规模,但在福利可持续性方面有社会代价。此外,在任何时候,主权国家都可以通过支付相应的破产费用宣布破产。我们表明,这些最优化问题承认一个平衡的解决方案,导致破产或稳态,这取决于初始条件。
英文摘要:
We consider a model of debt management, where a sovereign state trade some bonds to service the debt with a pool of risk-neutral competitive foreign investors. At each time, the government decides which fraction of the gross domestic product (GDP) must be used to repay the debt, and how much to devaluate its currency. Both these operations have the effect to reduce the actual size of the debt but have a social cost in terms of welfare sustainability. Moreover, at any time the sovereign state can declare bankruptcy by paying a correspondent bankruptcy cost. We show that these optimization problems admits an equilibrium solution, leading to bankruptcy or to a stationary state, depending on the initial conditions.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。