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arXiv 1607.02037cs.GTmath.OC
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网络上公共物品博弈均衡的细化:专业化均衡的效率与努力

Refinement of the Equilibrium of Public Goods Games over Networks: Efficiency and Effort of Specialized Equilibria

Parthe Pandit, Ankur A. Kulkarni

摘要:

最近,Bramoule和Kranton提出了一个通过网络提供公共产品的模型,并证明了一类称为专门均衡的纳什均衡的存在,其中一些代理人发挥最大努力,而其他代理人则搭便车。我们研究的效率,努力和成本的专门均衡相比,其他均衡。我们的主要结果表明,一个特定的专业化均衡的福利接近最大的福利在所有的均衡的收益函数的单位趋于1。对于森林网络来说,当网络的最小值趋近于零时,类似的结果也成立。此外,如果没有任何这样的条件,任何网络都存在一个特殊的均衡,它要求所有均衡中的最大加权努力。当网络是一个森林时,一个专门化的均衡也会在所有均衡中产生最小的总成本。对于覆盖良好的森林网络,我们证明了所有的福利最大化均衡是专门的,所有的均衡产生相同的总成本。因此,我们认为,专业化均衡可以被认为是一个细化的公共产品博弈的均衡。我们展示了几个结果的结构和效率的平衡,突出的依赖在网络中的作用。

英文摘要:

Recently Bramoulle and Kranton presented a model for the provision of public goods over a network and showed the existence of a class of Nash equilibria called specialized equilibria wherein some agents exert maximum effort while other agents free ride. We examine the efficiency, effort and cost of specialized equilibria in comparison to other equilibria. Our main results show that the welfare of a particular specialized equilibrium approaches the maximum welfare amongst all equilibria as the concavity of the benefit function tends to unity. For forest networks a similar result also holds as the concavity approaches zero. Moreover, without any such concavity conditions, there exists for any network a specialized equilibrium that requires the maximum weighted effort amongst all equilibria. When the network is a forest, a specialized equilibrium also incurs the minimum total cost amongst all equilibria. For well-covered forest networks we show that all welfare maximizing equilibria are specialized and all equilibria incur the same total cost. Thus we argue that specialized equilibria may be considered as a refinement of the equilibrium of the public goods game. We show several results on the structure and efficiency of equilibria that highlight the role of dependants in the network.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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